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INTRODUCTION
The study of an election is often a difficult task
but always most interesting.

It is made difficult by the fre-

quent intangibility of the influence deciding the individual
voter.

The pollsters, Roper and Gallup, have illustrated the

difficulties involved in an election and their failure makes
any further comment unnecessary_

The interest of an elec-

tion, however, can arise from a number of factors.

There is

the appeal of the candidates to the people, their characters
and personalities, the types of campaigning, the issues involved and the Significance of the outcome.

All of these

elements have been highlighted by the latest presidential race
between President Harry Truman and Governor Thomas Dewey in
November, 1948, which would also deserve mention on my part,
if only for the fact that it was the closest election since
the one we will treat.
many and varied.

The issues of the 1948 election were

The appeal of the candidates was on a dif-

ferent plane for the one man was a farm boy who appealed to
the Simple, home-loving American, while the other was more restrained, dignified, intellectual.

The Democratic candidate

spoke of specific proposals and legislation, while the Rei
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publican candidate, confident of victory, sailed his campaign
ship upon a sea of platitudes hoping to gain the shores of
victory upon the wave of tlnational unitylt.
A complete study of an election would demand a
thorough consideration of all these elements that I have mentioned and even more.

However, in this study we would like to

concentrate upon only one of these elements in the 1916 election, namely, the issues involved, especially from the time of
the conventions to the election.

It would entail more time aru

study than is possible here to treat every issue of this presidential race, and so we will restrict ourselves to those issues seemingly most influential upon the voters, to those that
received most of the candidates' attention and attracted the
most publicity.

We have tried to sift the issues and classi-

fy them, not arbitrarily, but according to their importance,
which was indicated by the attention of the candidates, newspapers, periodicals and by the actual results.

We will see

that some issues weTe not properly evaluated during the campaign but were highly overrated by the attention given them.
Others appeared shortly before the election and demanded an
immediate and just acknowledgment by the people.

Vfuile this

paper is not as complete as possible, since it will be more of
a survey than an analysis of the issues, still it should add
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some understanding to the terse comments of authors upon the
outcome of the 1916 election.
Since we will be looking for elements that decided
the election in favor of the Democrats, the reader should
not be surprised that the treatment of the issues and many
of the quotations are favorable to Wilson.

Indeed the issues

gain that much more importance when they are credited with
having influenced a number of people to vote for him, for
we are thus enabled to narrow down Wilson's channels of influence and conjecture upon what swung the election to him.
The election of 1916 was not the stunning upset
that took place in 1948, but it was similar in the fact that
the man in office stood upon specific legislation and proposals while the challenging candidate was satisfied or
forced to dwell upon platitudes and criticism. Just as in
1948 when the appeal of such a course fell short of victory
for Dewey, so in 1916 the appeal of Hughes in this same manner was not enough to swing the winning votes to his side of
the ledger.
In 1916 the critical state of the world made the
election of extreme importance and yet the outcome was to
turn upon the votes of a very few states and a comparatively
small number of people.

Indeed the men were so very much

iiii

alike, the platforms so similar and the issues so comparatively few that the election was one of the closest in the
history of the United States.

Two New York newspapers pro-

claimed Hughes the President only to be forced into a retraction in a later edition by more complete returns from
the polls of the West.

The results, therefore, enhance the

importance of the issues for anyone of them might have been
the deciding factor in the slight majority of the winner.
Naturally, it is impossible to determine the issue that decided the vote, but we can hope, at least, to shed some
light upon the nature and importance of those issues involved from the conventions to the elections.

CHAPTER I
THE CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS
In studying the issues, naturally the platforms
formulated at the conventions will be more important than the
conventions themselves.

However, the conventions take on a

greater importance when they achieve more than their primary
purpose of selecting the candidates.

Such was the case in

June, 1916.
The Democratic party, holding their meeting at St.
Louis in mid-June, showed the country a solidly united
organization in nominating their candidate by acclamation
rather than by the ordinary procedure.

As Woodrow Wilson

had no competitor for the nomination the convention was more
a ratification than a selection.

As one of his biographers

said: "The Democrats, both the body of the party in the South
and its fairly certain allies in the Western states, were
proud of their leader.
Andrew Jackson."

They had not such a spokesman since

He also noted that even the party masters

in New York, Indiana and Illinois who nourished a dislike for
Wilson because the side-doors of the White House were shut to
them, agreed to the nomination.
1

Everyone realized that

2

Wilson's record was their biggest asset. l
The Republican convention, on the other hand, did
not offer the same picture of unity, but was rather a convention definitely needed to narrow down the Republican candidates to one acceptable by both the Progressives and the Republicans.

The discreet selection of Charles Evans Hughes

probably achieved the highest degree of unity possible between
these two parties, although this fact was not immediately evident to all concerned.

While, then, the Republicans were

achieving this unity the Democrats were displaying it and, in
so doing, unwittingly gave birth to a vote-winning slogan that
was to sweep the country during the months of campaigning and
thus become an influential factor in the election.
The convention of the Democrats verified in a
striking way the convictions of President Wilson that the
people of the country, the mass, wanted peace and not war.
He was aware of the fact that the pacifists in those pre-war
days far outnumbered the comparatively few who were listening to the urgings of a militaristic spirit.

It was this

conviction, of course, that had motivated his determination
to remain neutral in
fairs.

~egard

to both European and Mexican af-

As "Current Opinion" pointed out, the dominant purpose

1 William E. Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work, Doubleday,
Page & Co., New York, 1920, 182-183.---
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of the convention was to vindicate this policy of the President in keeping the United States out of war.2
It was in the light of the convention's aims that
the speeches, usually frothy effusions of no merit, gained
some importance.

For the keynote speech, in conforming to

the purpose of the convention, was soon discovered to be also
in rhythm with the pulse of the nation, or at least that
cross-section of the nation represented at the assembly.
Governor Martin H. Glynn, of New York, who had been selected
for thE

key-note oration, was probably delightfully surprise

at the enthusiastic reaction of that crowd to his welldelivered speech. 3

He had decided to stress the note of

peace and the policy of neutrality so frequently adopted by
our country in the past.

At the outset he stressed the

general ideas of neutrality, its place in American ideals,
and proceeded to the proof that Wilson's adherence to
neutrality was in accordance with the traditional American
policy.

To enforce his arguments he began an enumeration

of the many instances in American history in which a foreign
outrage of one sort or another had been adequately met, not
by war but by diplomacy.

Naturally, he was then to point

2 Current Opinion, Vol. LX, July, 1916, 3.
3 Official Report Qf the Proceedings of the Democratic
National Convention (held in St. Louis, Missouri), 14-21.

4

to the similarity in Wilson's achievements.
Glynn had cited a few examples when he feared that
perhaps he was too dull and not appealing to the crowd, and
so remarked, "I don't want to take too much time to enumerate
them all tt , but then, to his surprise, the crowd shouted back,
"Go on, go on."

When Glynn realized that they really meant

it, he continued with more confidence and soon had the crowd
hanging on his every word.

After each example, besides add-

ing, ttbut we didn't go to war,tt he also asked the crowd,
Receiving the cries of ttYes,

ttDo you want more of them?t1
yes~"

he continued.

After reciting precedents established by

Pierce, Van Buren, Jefferson, Adams, Washington, before he
could say, "But we didn't go to war," the crowd now interposed the question, "What did we do?" with a great unified
shout.
The crowd was proving to be an ideal audience, devouring every word.

Men were jumping up on their seats and

waving the American flag.

In

his treatment of the conven-

tion, Walter Millis quotes a good conjecture on this scene •
••• What was going on in their minds was
as easily read as if it had been printed •••
Pacifism had been jeered at, made to seem
in opposition to Americanism, until they
had come to feel almost apologetic about
it. Now they were told they had been right
all the time, that one could be patriotic
and pacifistic, that it was the historic
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American policy to submit to great
provocation and historically un-American
to go to war over it; and they could not
contain themselves. 4
The extraordinary enthusiasm of the crowd, however,
worried the party leaders at least momentarily for it looked
like a huge pacifist demonstration.

Senator John Smith of

Maryland and McCombs after a brief conference, passed to Glynn
duripg one of the ovations a scrawled note reading, "but we
are willing to fight if necessary."5

Glynn assured them,

"I'll take care of that", which he did in a whole section on
preparedness, assuring the crowd that "the Democratic party
advocates and seeks preparedness, but it is preparedness for
defense and not preparedness for aggression'~6 But Glynn
reached the heights of convention oratory in another passage
that commentators on this occasion delight in quoting:
This po'licy does not satisfy those who
revel in destruction and find pleasure in
despair. It may not satisfy the fireeater or the swashbuckler. But it does
satisfy those who worship at the altar of
the God of peace. It does satisfy the
mothers of the land, at whose hearth and
fireside no jingoistic war has placed an
empty chair. It does satisfy the daughters

4 Walter Millis, Road to War, 1914-1917, Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1935, 319.
_
5 Baker, Ray Stannard, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters,
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947, Vol. V, 252.
6 Official Proceedings of Democratic Convention, 29.
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of this land, from whom brag and
bluster have sent no husband, no sweetheart and no brother to the smouldering
dissolution of the grave. It does satisfy the fathers of this land, and the
sons of this land, who will fight for
our flag, and die for our flag, when
Reason primes the rifle, when Honor
draws the sword, when Justice breathes
a blessing on the standards they uphold.?
Thus Glynn's appeal to the pacifists on the ground that the
President had not brought this country into war was carefully balanced with an appeal to the bellicose that Wilson
was also ready to fight if necessary.
Two other speeches drove home these same ideas to
the crowd.

The second day presented Senator Ollie James of

Kentucky whom the New York Times described as having "the
face of a prizefighter, the body of an oak, and the voice of
a pipe organ, and all the tricks of the orator at the tip of
his tongue. uB

The passage of his speech which was re-

pea ted in response to the demands of the crowd likewise
stressed Wilson's neutrality policy •
••• Without orphaning a single American
child, without widowing a single American mother, without firing a single gun,
without the shedding of a single drop of
blood, he wrung from the most militant
spirit that ever brooded above a battlefield an acknowledgment of American
rights and an agreement to American
? Ibid., 26.
York Times, June 16, 1916.

B New
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demands. He truly demonstrated that
principle is mightier than force, that
diplomacy hath its victories no less
renowned than war.9
Bryan, the convention's favorite, who spoke that same evening, declared:

"I have differed with our President on some

of the methods employed, but I join with the American people
in thanking God that we have a President who does not want
this country plunged into this war. tllO
The long quotations from these speeches stress the
unifying element running through them but more important they
give an indication of how there arose from the convention
that all-important slogan, "He kept us out of war."

The

exact words seem to have been put into the platform by a person unknown to this day despite the research efforts of Ray
Stannard Baker.

After the endorsement of the President and

Vice President there followed this statement in the platform:
••• In particular we commend to the
American people the splendid diplomatic
victories of our great President, who
has preserved the vital interests of
our Government and its citizens, and
kept us out of war. ll

9 Democratic Convention, 88-89_
10 Ibid., 98-99.
11 I bid., 130.
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Newton Baker, who probably knew more of the origin of the
platform than any other- delegate, wrote to R. S. Baker:
"The phrase 'He kept us out of war' was put in by the Resolutions Committee, by which member I do not know.

I myself

always regarded it as a product of the Glynn speech."12

Be

that as it may, the Democrats had an effective slogan for the
coming campaign and a remarkable unity that was made evident
by the vote of acclamation given to Wilson, 1092 to 1.
A discussion of the Republican nomination really
demands the story of two conventions for it was with a definite purpose that both the Republican and Progressive parties
called their respective conventions for the same day in June
in Chicago.

Some sort of reconciliation between these two

parties was obviously in order since the power of the Progress
ives was on the wane,13 and a refusal to reunite would only
result in the election of the Democratic candidate.

This had

been the case in 1912 when Roosevelt, bolting the Republican
party, split their vote and took with him as a Progressive
candidate 4,126,020 votes in comparison with the Republican
Taft's 3,483,922 votes.

Thus Wilson was elected with

12 Baker, 257 (footnote).
13 Frederic Paxson, Pre-War Years, 1913-1917, Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1936, 32b.
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1,300,000 votes less than the combined total of Taft and
Rooseve1t. 14

Nevertheless, it was not too evident from the

opening speeches of both conventions that a combination of
the parties was possible.
The

key-note speech at the Republican convention

was given by handsomeWarren Gamaliel Harding who, William
Allen White claimed, was "bitter, scalding bitter to Theodore Roosevelt," despite a plea that both parties forget
their differences, 15 while at the Progressive convention
Raymond Robins made a rabble-rousing key-note speech and had
become the "idol of the men who had determined to nominate
Roosevelt.lt1 6

In the Republican convention it was definite

that the Taft men would simply not permit the nomination of
Roosevelt, while the Progressives would not consider Root,
Lodge or Hughes.

This apparent deadlock prevailed right up

to the end of the two conventions.
According to White, who covered the conventions for
the newspapers and was on the inside of the maneuverings in
the Progressive party, Perkins, the head of the Progressive
Party, t1was trying to maneuver the Rooseveltians into accept14 Samuel E. Morrison & H. S. Commager, The Growth of the
American Republic, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1942,
Vol. II, Statistical Tables in Appendix, 742.
15 William A. White, The Autobiogra~hY of William Allen White,
Macmillan Company, New York, 194 , 522.
16 Ibid., 523.
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ing Hughes as a fusion nominee."l?

At the same time, how-

ever, there was a group of Progressives striving to bring
about the nomination of Roosevelt before the Republican
nominee could be offered to the convention.

The latter fac-

tion, of which White was a member, won and Roosevelt was
nominated just before noon on the last day amidst a great fanfare despite the efforts of Perkins to control the floor.
Shortly after, at the Republican convention Hughes received
the nomination of the Republican party.
Thus, the desire of the Progressives to have their
standard bearer accepted by the Republicans was not to be attained even tho the mention of Roosevelt's name as a nominee
at the Republican convention had evoked a rousing round of
applause and a demonstration that continued for forty minutes.
But when two ballots were cast before adjourning on Friday
evening Hughes led the field while Roosevelt commanded the
noise.

The Republicans' stampede to Hughes at Saturday noon

ended all uncertainty, and Hughes himself left them with no
doubts as to his intentions or his capacity for action, for he
immediately sent his resignation to the President announcing
his retirement from the Supreme Court.

17 Ibid., 523.

r
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The Progressives, moreover, were to be disappointed
a second time.

They had not made sure of Roosevelt's accept-

ance if nominated.

Although the Colonel had given a con-

ditional refusal before the convention, still he had not
publicly foresworn the Progressive Party since he was hoping
for a nomination by the combination of the two parties.

How-

ever, those who were close to Roosevelt were of the opinion
that he would never again lead a third party.

"Americans

are a two-party people, there is no place for a third party
in our politics" were his words to a friend. 18 It was the
knowledge that such a candidacy was doomed to failure, plus
his passion for a defeat of Wilson, that finally made
Roosevelt turn down the Progressive candidacy.

Accordingly,

he sent word to the convention that he would not run and then
proceeded to name as alternate candidate nenry Cabot Lodge,
"perhaps the one man whose long record of bourbon conservatisrn offered the greatest denial of every liberal tenet to
which the party had been dedicated,".19 Secretary of Agriculture Houston,present at the moment of the announcement, said,
itA more stunned, whipped crowd, I had never looked upon.
was a pitiful spectacle.

It had been hoaxed.,,20

It

White

18 Paxson, £R.cit., 334.
19 Millis, £R.cit., 317.
20 David F. Houston, Eight Years ~ Wilson's Cabinet,Doubleday, Page & Company, New York, Vol. I.
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records, that he saw "hundreds of men tear the Roosevelt picture or the Roosevelt badge from their coats, and throw it
on the floor.,,21

Another spectator, Ida Tarbell, also re-

corded the resentment evident at that moment:

"It was a

great and noble-hearted body, and its tremendous fight deserved a better end than the cowardly stab that its leader
gave it in the message which its chairman mercifully and
wisely withheld until almost the moment of adjournment. tt22
All these remarks are significant in the light of the later
defection of the Progressives from the Republican party.
Since the Progressives were not only without a
nominee but also a man who could command enough votes to make
it worthwhile to run as their candidate, there was nothing
left to do but endorse the Republican candidate.

It is

significant, however, that when the National Committee did
meet again on June 26 to vote, the endorsement was divided
with 32 for, 6 against Hughes, and 9 silent. 23
Nevertheless, the choice of Charles Evans Hughes
was perhaps the best one possible.

Even Joseph Tumulty,

Wilson's secretary, admitted that after Hughes' nomination
21 White, 527
22 Ida Tarbell, quoted in American Year Book, 1916, 30.
23 Paxson, 345.
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"there was deep depression in the ranks of our party throughout the country, the opinion being that the former Supreme
Court Justice was an invincible foe. tt24

The greatest factor

in his favor seemed to be the fact that he had no part in the
schism of 1912.

In his lofty position in the Supreme Court

he had been above the "dust and clamor of partisan feuds" and
had maintained silence.

White thought it the best possible

nomination because most of Roosevelt's friends preferred
Hughes to Taft as did also the followers of LaFollette. 2 5
Roosevelt himself "supported Hughes largely because he
bitterly disliked Wilson in all his works and ways~26
The appeal of Hughes to the people was evident.

He

had been a great reform governor of New York, and his honest
and able exposure of the venal and

c~iminal

actions of big

business, the great insurance companies, and the machine
elements of both the Democratic and the Republican parties,
gave promise of a good national government. 27

His service

with the Supreme Court doubtlessly added great distinction
to the Republican's cause.

Of great help, too, was his

silence upon all phases of the war, including the Lusitania
incident and the submarine warfare.
24 Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As 1 Know Him, Garden City
Publishing Company, New York, 1927, 191.
25 Qn.cit., 528.
26 Ibid., 528.
27 Dodd, 185.

r
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Another thing about Hughes, mentioned mostly by
the followers of Wilson, was his very close resemblance to
the President, which, Baker claims, was Hughes' peculiar
availability from the beginning. 28

Roosevelt himself later

dubbed Hughes ria whiskered Wilson" while a newspaperman was
asking as early as the April before the convention: "What is
the purpose of nominating Justice Hughes?

To continue the

Wilson administration under Republican auspices? tl2 9

This

point is of some importance, at least to my mind, for it
seems to throw a little light on the extreme closeness of
this presidential race.

There seems to be no doubt that the

Republicans did not want to differ with Wilson upon the most
vital issue of the day, namely, entanglement in war on either
side of the belligerents.

If this issue was going to be met

head on, then Roosevelt or Wood would have been chosen for
the whole country knew that those men stood for immediate
and extensive military and naval preparation and for prompt
military action.

But the Republican leaders knew the tem.per

of the country as well as the Democrats and they knew that
the people did not want war.

Hence we have in the champion

28 Baker, 247.
29 Frank I. Cobb, .lliU! York World, April 2, 1916.

-
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and the challenger two candidates very similar to one another
in character, background and ideals.

This similarity will

now move over into the issues of the campaign and thus help
to provide a close battle dovm the stretch to the election.
There was such a marked likeness between the two
platforms that the Socialists in their Hand Book for the campaign printed the two platforms with an issue-by-issue contrast under the heading, tlVihere I s the Issue?,,30 There was a
great deal of truth behind this question for the points of
agreement were numerous.

The position of each party on

women's suffrage was one instance.

Both platforms likewise

demanded stric't enforcement of the civil service laws, a
simple and business-like budget system for the government,
a rigid economy in national expenditure, the encouragement
of business, and the strict supervision and regulation of
monopoly.

The Republicans requested an "effective system

of rural credits" while the Democrats boasted, "we passed
the rural credits act."

The two parties called for a tariff

commission for impartial study of that problem, and for the
careful conservation of natural resources; and while the
Republicans favored the extension of a rural mail delivery
system, again the Democrats could boast that they had added
10,000 delivery routes. 31
30 Socialist Hand
31 Ibid., 30.

~,

The Socialist Party, Chicago, 1916,30
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Upon the smaller points of foreign policy such as
closer, more friendly relations with the Pan-American Republics and approval of the Monroe Doctrine, they were in
perfect agreement.

Moreover, although the platforms dis-

agreed in their attitude toward the Philippines with the Republicans being more inclined to grant independence sooner
than the Democrats, still there was little discussion of this
issue during the campaign. 32
With regard to the attitude of the parties upon the
threatening war, it was clear that both favored adequate preparedness, an adequate army and navy for defense, an adequate
merchant marine, the protection of American citizens in all
his rights at home and abroad, by land and sea, and the maintenance of a strict and honest neutrality.

Obviously, there

was no clash here in aims or ideals, but the Republicans
nevertheless made a major issue out of Wilson's handling of
these policies, expressing more disapproval of this procedure
than of his purpose.
Mexican policy.

This same approach was taken on Wilson's

Another point upon which the platforms

agreed in ideal but not in fact was the civil service reform.
While both parties advocated it, the Republicans claimed that
the Wilsonian administration had been chock-full of partisanship appointments.
32 Ibid., 30.

The tariff, however, was a subject of

17
definite disagreement as was also the matter of progressive
legislation.

The Democrats were not only able to appeal in

their platform to Wilson's record but on the strength of his
record they were able also to predict more social and
economic reforms, whereas the Republicans in the role of
challengers naturally had no record nor did they advocate as
many new reforms as the Democrats. 33
In treating all of these issues I should like to
consider the tariff, cIvil service, and the Mexican policy as
a unit because in spite of the fact that the Republicans laid
great stress upon these issues, the strategy involved
terminated in failure.

On the other hand the other two is-

sues of the parties, their respective attitudes to the
threatening war and appeals to the Progressives, take on the
greatest importance because they were considered by the newspapers and independent authors to be the predominant and deciding factors in the victory of the Democrats.
ceive more attention.

They will re

However, with regard to the first

three issues we must at least give the respective stands of
the parties and the candidates.

But before we consider any

of them, we must turn our attention to a peculiar phenomenon
in the 1916 election worthy of our consideration, a phenomeno
that I have termed, the "artificial issues."

33 Ibid., 30.

CHAPTER II
ARTIFICIAL ISSUES
In many presidential campaigns, there appear issues
that gain undeserved publicity and attention.

For a time

these issues dominate all others in the newspapers only to
lose their appeal before the election, or at least, fail to
have any noticeable effect upon the voting.

That is why I

would refer to such issues as "artificial", for though there
might even be a divergence of opinion upon the subject involved, still because their importance is so very much overrated they do not deserve a place with the real major issues
of the campaign.

There were two such issues in the 1916 cam-

paign and their prominence in the thought of all demands acknowledgment in a study of this election.

The newspapers

pounced upon these issues, the persons affected protested
their value to the candidates, and for a time they seemed to
be of major importance.

However, when the showdown arrived

at the time of the election they disappeared into the ranks
of the insignificant.
One of the issues that followed this pattern faithfully was the so-called "hyphenate" issue which received attention even before the conventions met because of President
Wilson's outspokenness on the subject.
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As early as November

19
4, 1915, in an address given at the Manhattan Club in New
York, he expressed his grave concern over the voices being
raised in America "which came from men who loved other
countries better than they loved America, men who were partisans of other causes than that of America."

lie claimed

that they had forgotten that their chief and only allegiance
was to the great government under which they live. l

Of much

more importance than this speech was his annual message to
Congress in Joint Session on December

7, a little over a

month later, when he again struck at the un-American spirit
of certain quarters of the country:
There are citizens of the U.S., I
blush to admit, born under other flags
but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured
the poison of disloyalty into the very
arteries of our national life ••• (who)
seek to make this proud country once
more a hotbed of European passion. 2
Though this topic was referred to as the "hyphenate" question before this time, Wilson helped to perpetuate
the term when he again attacked this overzealous partisanship
in a speech in honor of John Barry, Father of the American
Navy.

Wilson's attacks were still general, not stating the

1 Albert Shaw, President Wilson's State Papers ~ Addresses,
George H. Doran Company, New York, 1917, 132.
2 Ibid., 150.
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particular hyphenates involved such as the Germans, English
or Irish.

But in this particular speech the allusion was

rather obvious since Wilson was angered at the anti-English
opposition to the repeal of the tolls-exemption clause, then
pending.
Some Americans need hyphens in thiir
names, because only part of them have
come over. But when the whole man has
come over, heart and thought and all,
the hyphen drops of its own weight out
of his name. j
These were not the only references made to the
hyphenate issue during the months before the conventions but
they are enough to indicate that the problem had a prominent
place in Wilson's thoughts.

During this time, however, some

German-Americans had formed an alliance, met at a convention
in Chicago, and were now threatening to wield their influence at the polls of the next election.

Greatly angered at

this attempt at intimidation, President Wilson spoke harshly against the hyphenates in the Flag Day Address at Washington on June 14, the very day that the Democratic convention
opened in st. Louis.

He referred to active disloyalty in

the country and how it should be crushed even if it proceeded
from a very active and subtle minority.

Then he attacked its

3 Ray S. Baker and W. E. Dodd, The Public Papers of Woodrow
Wilson, Harpers & Brothers, New York, 1926, III, 109.
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method of operating:
It works underground, but it shows
its ugly head where we can see it; and
there are those at this moment who are
trying to levy a species of blackmail,
saying IDo what we wish in the interest
of foreign sentiment or we will wreak
our vengeance at the polls,.4
Thus we see that the issue was connected with the vote, and
that Wilson has taken a firm stand.
The Democratic newspapers, especially the New York
World, were also accusing the German-American Alliance of
organizing to control the vote.5

Articles appeared in

independent magazines such as the Atlantic Monthly, Outlook
and the Living Age attacking those Germans who were only
geographically and politically American.

That this offen-

sive was sustained as well as critical can be ascertained
from the fact that as early as October 1915 the Literary
Digest had written an article which characterized the
attacks as a "Swat-the-Hyphen" movement. 6

As the three

parties approached their respective conventions, there
was some speculation as to just how each party would approach this problem now that it had forced itself upon the
attention of potential voters throughout the country, for,
4 ~ York Times, June 15, 1916.
5 ~ York World, March 19, 1916, was an example.
6 Literary Digest, October 15, 1915, 943-944.

22
indeed, the problem seemed to involve not only the votes of
the hyphenates themselves but others also because of the
prevailing strong sentiment for and against these GermanAmerican people.
Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, as usual, left the
German-Americans and his Progressive Party in little doubt
as to his stand.

His violent attacks upon the hyphenates

had made newspaper columns time and time again.

Although

he must have realized there were other factors precluding
his nomination, nevertheless considerable importance was
attached by the Colonel to this one.

On November 27, 1915

in a letter to his friend Lodge, he had observed that "the
German-Americans of every kind, and whole flapdoodle pacifist and mollycoddle outfit" would be against him~"7
even more to the point on December 7 he wrote:

And

liAs you

know, I feel that the course I have followed about the
hyphenated Americanism, and especially the German-American
vote, is such as absolutely to preclude the possibility of
nominating me as a candidate. u8
The passage of time only served to heighten the
anger of Mr. Roosevelt for after a conference of the GermanAmerican Alliance on May 28 and 29 his attacks became more

7 Hermann Hagedorn, Correspondence of Roosevelt ~ Lodge,
Charles Scribner and Sons, New York, 1925, II, 464.
8 Ibid., ~66-467; see 479 for another letter expressing the
same 0 inion.
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furious.

He gave a speech at the very day after the close

of the meeting.

The editor of the World, who was pro-

Democratic and hence rarely impressed by anything that Roosevelt said, styled his talk as "hitting straight from the
shoulder," for Roosevelt denounced the Alliance as an "antiAmerican alliance,tI and its activities as "moral treason" to
the republic.,,9

Doubtless, another good reason for Roose-

velt's anger was the tenor of the resolutions adopted by the
German-American Newspapers Publishers Association during that
meeting.

While the meeting named no names in the resolu-

tions adopted on May 29, "it hardly concealed behind its
descriptions of the requirements for a candidate who might deserve the united German-American vote ••• the negation of
both Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt." lO

Moreover, when

on June 5 the German-American Alliance sent protests to the
Progressive Party Committee against the possible nomination
of Roosevelt and Root, Roosevelt returned t·o the attack with
a message to the same committee on June 22 that was stinging
in bitterness:
No good American whatever his ancestry
or creed can have any feeling except scorn
and detestation for those professional
German-Americans who seek to make the
American President in effect a viceroy of
9 New York World, June 1, 1916.
10 Paxson, 339.
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the German Emperor. The Professional
German-Americans of this type are acting purely in the sinister interest of
Germany.ll
Without a doubt this attitude of Roosevelt on the hyphenate
question had an influence upon the Republican Committee, although it was probably the least of their reasons for refusing to nominate him.

Nevertheless, the issue loomed

l~gein

those early days of June, and the Republican candidate was to
be one who had not alienated all of these German-American
votes.
The silence of Charles Evans Hughes on this, as well
as on other political matters, made him even more acceptable
to the Republican Committee but especially did it raise the
hopes of the German-American Newspapers and his nomination
was greeted with great outbursts of enthusiasm.

Typical of

these newspapers was the reaction of a Milwaukee paper which,
upon news of his nomination, plastered a picture of him and
Mrs. Hughes on the front page and expressed their hope and
confidence with the words beneath the picture: "the next president and his wife."12

Hope even traveled across the seas

to Germany where the Cologne paper, the Kolnische Zeitung,
reputed for generations to be the mouthpiece of the .. erman
Foreign Office policy, seemed to look with a favorable eye
11 American Year Book, 1916, 33.
12 Milwaukee-Sonntagspost, June 11, 1916.
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upon the Hughes candidacy.

It expressed its delight that

Roosevelt's ttchauvinistic anti-Germanism lf had been definitely
repudiated by the Republican party.13

This same paper did

not entertain any very good opinion of Wilson for in the same
issue it said "that German-Americans, on whose vote perhaps
the decision of the election rests are for the most part publicly on the side of Hughes," and pointed to their "opportunity of paying back President Wilson for his false, hypocritical neutrality and for his unheard of attacks on this American nationality.,,14
The Republicans, therefore, did not pass up the
opportunity offered them but made tla determined effort to woo
the pro-German element.,,15

Accordingly at the Republican

convention Chairman Warren G. Harding dealt with the issue
in a rather soothing manner in his opening address on June 7:
One must be human; to be an American
he must have sympathies and human loves;
and I should pity the foreign-born sons of
foreign-born parents whose very souls are
not wrung £~ the catacylsmal sorrow of the
old world.
The Republican platform was likewise mild in its approach to
13 ~iterary Digest, 53:1, July 1, 1916.
14 Ibid.
15 Thomas A. Bailey, Diplomatic history of the American
People, F. S. Crofts & Co., 1946, 638-9.
16 Republican Campaign Text Book, Republican National Committee, 1916, 28.
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the subject: "We appeal to all Americans, whether naturalized
or native born, to prove to the world that we are Americans i
thought and in deed, with only one loyalty, one hope and one
aspiration."

It then called upon "all Americans to be true

to the spirit of America, to the great traditions of their
common country. l1l 7
This Republican strategy seemed to demand that
Hughes should try to straddle the pro-German issue.

The

theme of his nomination speech was "America first and America
efficient.tt

When he said that he was "for the firm and un-

flinching maintenance of all the rights of American citizens
on land and seat! the Germans took that to mean that he would
enforce American commercial rights as against the British
blockade. 18

This use of vague phrases by Hughes led "to his

being renamed Charles 'Evasive' Hughes, and to the quip that
he had left the bench for the fence. tt19
There was no "pussyfooting" on the issue by the
Democrats.

We have already seen how Wilson, even before the

conventions met, had attacked the hyphenates.

For a brief

moment, however, there was a tendency among members of the
17 Official Report of the Proceedings Q£ the Republican
National Convention, 164.
18 The New Republic, July 9, 1919.
19 Bailey, quoted by, 639.

27
party at the Democratic convention to straddle the issue
and side-track forceful language against it.

When Tumulty

was informed by one of the editors of the Milwaukee Journal
that this spirit was prevalent among party members, he
realized that the adoption of this attitude in the platform would result in bitter disappointment to the country,
and so he immediately wrote to Wilson that the hyphen issue
should be met in a "manly, aggressive and militant fashion.u~)
At once Wilson warned Secretary Baker, his representative
at the convention, to insist upon a Itdefinite and unequivocal
repudiation of the hyphen vote." 21

The Presidentrs tele-

gram to Baker resulted in the insertion of a paragraph in
the platform that condemned in strong language all hyphenate
activity in behalf of a foreign power.22 Wilson never
stopped in this drive against the hyphenates but perhaps
his best declaration of independence of this element was
in his acceptance speech from Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, his
summer headquarters - "I neither seek the favor nor fear
the displeasure of that small alien element which puts
loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United
States. 23
20
21
22
23

Tumulty, 188-190.
Ibid., 190.
Democratic Convention~ 122.
Baker and Dodd, II, 2~2-283.
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As usual the newspapers lined up on both sides
and for a while hyphenism was one of the two planks of the
Democratic party upon which the "fire of the opposition
seemed to center ••• tt24

Republican newspapers and the

German-American papers like the Germania-Herold of Milwaukee
claimed that the Democratic stand was "an attack upon a
whole nationality," the Free Press of Lincoln, Nebraska
stated that it was "an insult to all Americans of German
blood" while the New Yorker Staats Zeitung echoed more or
less the same sentiments. 2 5 However, a few reputedly
Republican papers like the Des MoinesCapitol admired the
stand of the President and commended its opponents for
being uplainer and bolder in this declaration of Americanism"
than the Republican platform; and the New York Press af£irmed
that the "hyphenates have more to hope for from Wilson than
from Hughes. ,,26
Wilson's Democratic colleagues hoped that press
comments like the following would have a sobering effect on
anyone who intended to cast his vote for Hughes:
If Hughes should be elected President
his success would be regarded throughout
24 "The Democrats and the Issues," Literary Digest, 53:1,
July 1, 1916.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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the world as a tremendous victory for
Germany in the U.S. It would be a
notice to all civilization that the
German vote, and through the German
vote the German Government, holds the
balance of povler in American politics. 27
Editorials such as "We Fight Mit Hughes," and "German Drive
Against Wilson," might have made the German-American espousal of Hughes a burden rather than a help.

Ambassador

Gerard was probably right \"hen he said that for Wilson it
soon became "an asset to have the German-American against
him. ,,28
But Hughes had more to contend with than the
Democratic newspapers.

There was his bellicose associate,

Teddy Roosevelt, whose ranting speeches probably alienated
many pro-German and peace-loving Republicans.

There were

some who thought that Roosevelt's speeches did much to
embarass Hughes.

For instance, in a letter to President

Wilson Colonel House claimed that he had been informed by
newspapermen that "Hughes vIas becoming more irritable and
that it is caused largely by Roosevelt's speeches."29

In

his book Mr. Paxson points out that Itin this particular
aspect of the canvas, the support of Roosevelt was a liability to Hughes, for Roosevelt would make no concession to
27 New York World, June 13 1916.
28 Charles Seymour! ~ Intimate Papers of Colonel House,
Boston, 1928, II, 23.
29 Ibid., II, 371.
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prudence."

Roosevelt, he adds, spoke in contempt of what

he thought was hedging on the part of Hughes, and he was
growing in dislike of Hughes because of the latter's carefully balanced utterances.

"To his newspaper friends

Roosevelt criticized the inept technique with which Hughes,
instead of profiting by counsel, just 'withdraws into his
whiskers;' when he exploded to them about the 'bearded lady'
it was Hughes he had in mind. u 30
Fortunately for Hughes, the German-Americans were
not alienated by Roosevelt from their support of the republican side.

This was made evident after Roosevelt's attack

of the hyphenates in Lewiston, Maine when, despite a telegram from Hughes congratulating Roosevelt upon the speech,
the German-American newspapers hastened to give assurances
that they didn't care what Roosevelt said since Hughes was
the candidate. 31

However, the President did gain a tactical

advantage over Hughes in his treatment of the O'Leary case.32
Jeremiah A. O'Leary was a member of the American Truth
Society and apparently patronized by the German Embassy.
was engaged in dislodging the Irish and German votes from
the Democratic ticket, and so with his associates pushed
30 Paxson, 350.
31 Literary Digest, 53:12, Sept. 16, 1916.
32 Paxson, 350.

He
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the charge that 1;lilson was more harsh in his dealings with
Germany than with England, and that his neutrality was a
fraud.

In a long telegram to the President, in September

he denounced Wilson's insincerity and warned him of political
consequences.

In this telegram he also mentioned lililson' s

"truckling to the British Empire" and his "dictatorship over
Congress."

Seizing this opportunity afforded him by O'Leary,

Wilson, before a group of nevlspapermen, replied with a brief,
pointed answer that was quoted everywhere:
I would feel deeply mortified to
have you or anybody like you vote
for me. Since you have access to
many disloyal Americans, and I have
not, I will ask you to convey this
message to them.33
Tumulty regarded this decisive act by the President as
somewhat of a turning point in the campaign for at that
time the Democrats '",ere rather depressed due to the Maine
elections which indicated a victory for the Republicans in
the coming election.

He also felt that it won the hearty

and unanimous approval of the country for the president. 34
Robert Lansing, in his \,var Memoirs, thought that this "made
thousands of votes for its author."35 While Colonel House
33 Tumulty, 214.
34 Ibid. 214-215.
35 RObert Lansing, War Memoirs, Scribner & Sons, N.Y., 1935,
162-163.
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told the President that the telegram -,{as lithe best thing so
far in the campaign. 1I 3 6

A lone dissenter to all these

favorable opinions was Walter Millis who thought that it
probably cost the President New York where the Irish Tammany
votes dominated the Democratic party.37
Perhaps Hughes sensed the political significance
of Wilson's outspoken defiance of the hyphenates for he
himself hastened to add on October 24:

"I don I t want the

support of anyone to whom the interests of this nation are
not supreme. 1I 38

The New York Times probably expressed the

general reaction of the people to this statement when it
co~mented:

"He speaks too late and makes the fatal mistake

of saying in a weaker way what his opponent and men of
sturdier courage in his own party long ago said with full
sincerity and sledge-hammer emphasis. 1I3 9
Thus was the hyphenate problem treated by the
principal persons and parties involved in the election of
1916.

It is evident from the \,-lords of the candidates and

the comments of the newspapers and magazines that this was
considered a vital issue.

But despite all the hullabaloo

the German-American question as a vital election issue
36 House, I, 365.
37 Millis, 347.
38 ~ ~ Times, October 25, 1916.
39 ~., October 26, 1916.
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proved a colossal flop.

The German vote proved to be largely

a myth, and where not a myth a minor factor.

Just a short

while after the returns were counted the New York Times
voiced the opinion that prevailed generally in the other
newspapers and in the magazines:
A survey of the returns by states
fails to disclose where the hyphenate
vote threw a single electoral vote to
Hughes. Either there was no hyphen
vote or it was cancelled or more than
cancelled in ~ts own territory by antihyphen votes. 40
Two of the largest cities in the country with a
predominant German-American population were St. Louis and
Milwaukee and yet both were carried by Wilson.

In the little

city of Hoboken where propaganda for the German-American
was used quite intensively during the campaign Wilson beat
Hughes by a count of 5,167 to 4,201.

In Wisconsin, Maryland,

and Missouri the German-American vote might have been a
major factor but that is not too evident.

However, in

Cincinnati where German-Americans constituted one-third
of the people, there was a majority of 12,000 for Hughes in
Hamilton County of which Cincinnati is a part.

Yet even

this was in vain for the state of Ohio went to Wilson.
Where their votes might have produced results in accord

40 Ibid., November 12, 1916.

with their boasts was in Minnesota or Oregon but again the
evidence was not sufficient to verify the claim.
"The Disappearance of the Hyphen ll , a post-election editorial appearing in Fair Play, a German-American
weekly, carries in its title more or less the whole story
of this election issue.

Why it disappeared is a question

beyond our present inquiry.

It is sufficient for us to

note that the issue had a short-lived and illusory importance
in the campaign, but in the payoff of the election proved
to have had little or no ,value to the Republican candidate.
Another "artificial" issue that received just a
bit less publicity and attention was that of woman's suffrage.

The origin of suffragette parties in the various

states and their progress in gaining the right to vote need
not detain us.

It is sufficient to note that the suffra-

gettes were not discouraged by the failure of their amendment for universal suffrage in the previous election, but
were preparing to keep in the public eye in the coming
campaign of 1916.

They arranged a demonstration along with

a convention to be held in Chicago.

It met just two days

before the Republican convention when they also staged a
parade along Michigan Avenue supposedly to impress the
Republicans with their strength.

At the convention a

National Women's Party was launched.
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Hm"ever, the demonstration of their "power" and
enthusiasm seemedto have no noticeable effect upon the
platform of either party; the two were practically identical.
The Republican platform favored "the extension of the suffrage to women, but recognized the right of each state to
settle the question for itself;" while the Democratic platform differed little with its advocation of the "extension
of the franchise of the women of the country by the states;t41
It must be noted, h01.vever, that it was upon this question
that the Democratic convention had its most lively debate,
the discussion taking up almost sixteen pages in the published proceedings. 42

There were present "large numbers

of representatives of women's organizations, bedecked with
bright yellow sashes, ribbons and parasols, (who) filled
the galleries, vociferously demanding a sweeping declaration of the approval of their plank" which called for
universal women's suffrage by amendment to the federal
constitution and not by the state-by-state process. 4 3
However, when the substitute plank favored by the women
was put to a vote, it was defeated by a one-sided vote of
888 1/2 to 181 1/2, and the Wilson plank was adopted as
above stated. 44
41 Republican Convention, 168; Democratic Convention, 130.
42 Ibid., 131-147.
43 Baker, 261.
4~ Democratic Convention 147.
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It was evident what the reaction of the women's
organizations would be to both platforms.

"Suffrage Planks

Not Enough", the title of an article in the Literary Digest
shortly after the conventions, expressed exactly the
sentiments of the militant suffragettes. 4 5 Perpahs their
protests had something to do with the subsequent change of
Mr. Hughes.

At any rate, the Digest was able to write a

new column on the suffrage 'with this heading:

tlMr. Hughes

New Suffrage Plank" for, in the words of a newspaper quoted
in the article, :Hr. Hughes had "stolen a march on President
Wilson and delivered a telling blow against him in many
states," by coming out for the Susan B. Anthony constitutional amendment providing for woman suffrage. 46

It is

well to note that this statement attributed some power to
the suffragettes for it was a common opinion at this time.
Hughes had made no mention of the amendment in
his acceptance speech but on the very next day he had sent
a telegram in answer to an inquiry of Senator Sutherland of
Utah, which was quoted by the papers as follows:
In my answer to the notifi'cation, I
did not refer to the proposed Federal
amendment relating to the woman suffrage

45 Literary Digest,' 53:1, July 1, 1916.
46 Ibid., 53:7, August 12, 1916.
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as this was not mentioned in the platform ••• My view is that the proposed
amendment should be submitted and
ratified, and the subject removed from
political discussion.~7
Later that same day in a speech in New York before a Woman's
League, he gave as his reasons for favoring the equal suffrage amendment

the bitterness of this long continued

struggle of the women and the fact that such agitation
would only obscure the normal issues. 48 Whether these
reasons were sufficient or not, President Wilson, when
called upon by

~~s.

Carrie Chapman Catt, president of the

Women's Suffrage Association,to do the same, simply refused,
and in a letter to Mrs. E. P. Davis on August

5,

he made

this observation:
••• if I should change my personal attitude now, I should seem to the country
like nothing else than an angler for
votes, because ••• my attitude in this
matter has again and again been frankly
avowed •••
I have all along believed, and
still believe t that the thing can best
and most solidly be done by the action
of the individual states, and that the
time it will take to get it that way
will not be longer than the t~me it will
take to get it the other way.49

47 Ibid.
48 David F. Houston, Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet,
1913-1920, Doubleday~ Page and Co., New York, 1926, I,
49 Baker, 277 (footnote).

a4.
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As Baker adds, the President throughout the campaign "adhered
with good-humored flexibility to the position he had always
held.,,50
The threats and cajolings of the women's organizations were numerous and varied during the campaign.

They

boasted frequently of their power at the polls and predicted
a landslide of votes for Hughes by protesting women.

An

example of this "Ivas the National Women's Party convening
at Colorado Springs, Colorado, on August 11, pledging itself
to work in the twelve equal suffrage states to defeat the
Democratic candidate for President.
But alas! it was the same story as the hyphenate
issue, a great deal of shouting and threat-throwing with no
apparent effect.

Of the twelve suffrage states only two,

Illinois and Oregon, voted for Mr. Hughes, while all of the
others, including Arizona, Colorado,California, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nevada, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, voted
for the reelection of Wilson.

In Chicago, the city of the

Womanis Party convention, there was no sort of proof of the
assertion that the women supported Mr. Hughes because he
favored a suffrage amendment to the Constitution.

The

women of Cook County which includes Chicago, gave Hughes
50 Baker, 277 (footnote).
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about 135,000 votes and Mr. Wilson 130,000.

Since Illinois

wisely tabulated the votes of women separately from those
of men, the results pOinted out that "in political psychology, the feminine mind apparently differs little from
the masculine mind."

Clearly these statistics indicate

only one thing and that is "that the women voted just about
the same as the men."51

In other words, they showed them-

selves deaf to all appeals like those of the suffragettes
and voted on the major issues like the men.

Some states,

however, were even said to have been turned to Wilson by
the vote of the women.

In Kansas, for example, where

240,000 women voted for the first time, William Allen White,
editor of the Emporia Gazette, claimed that the result in
his state was due mainly to these votes of the women for
Wilson. 52

The Boston Post 53 and the New York Herald 54

shared this opinion while the editors of the Topeka Capitol
and the Wichita Beacon said practically the same thing.55
On this topic the Sacramento Union made the significant
observation that although the women voted for the Republican
51 World's ~, 33:118-119, December, 1916.
52 Boston ~, November 10, 1916.
53 Literary Digest, 53:21, November 18, 1916.
5~ ~ ~ Herald, November 10, 1916.
55 Literary Digest, ~.
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candidate for Governor, nevertheless they voted for Wilson
out of desire for peace.56

In Minnesota, the editor of

the Duluth News Tribune claimed that woman's vote was the
dominant factor in favor of Wilson,57 and a strong influence
was attached to the women's vote by the San Francisco
Chronicle 58 and the BUlletin,59 as well as the Los Angeles
Express 60 and the Seattle Post-Intelligencer. 61 Looking at
the vote of the whole country rather than at the individual
states, the New York Times attributed great importance to
the woman's vote in Wilson's victory as did the Harper's
weekly in its critique of the election results. 62
It is perhaps fitting, that we close our discussion of the second artificial issue with the words of Mrs.
Arthur Dodge, president of the National Association Opposed
to Woman's Suffrage, in a letter to the New York Times:
"The so-called Woman's Party ••• failed absolutely to carry
out the purpose for which it was organized - to defeat the
Democratic candidate in the States where women vote.,,63

56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Sacramento Union, Nov. 15, 1916.
Literary Digest, Ibid.
San Francisco Chronicle, November 11, 1916.
San Francisco Bulletin, November III 1916.
Los Angeles Express, November 11, 1~16.
Literary Digest, ~3:21, November 18, 1916.
New York Times, Nov. 12, 1916; Harper's Weekly, Nov. 20,
1916.
63 World's ~, 33, December, 1916.

CHAPTER III
THREE ISSUES MADE BY THE LOSING REPUBLICANS
Besides these "artificial" issues there were three
issues upon which the Republican candidate laid great emphasis
throughout his campaign.

One was the rather worn out question

of the tariff, a perennial favorite in campaigns.

Another

issue, also of frequent appearance in previous electioneering,
was the advocation of civil service reform; this was stressed
by Hughes because during the past administration the Democratic party had appeared guilty of partisanship in appointing unqualified Democrats to important federal offices.

The

third issue was really a criticism of the President's first
term foreign policy.

In this part of our thesis we will con-

sider only the Mexican foreign policy, for the European question will be discussed later not as a strong point for the Republicans but rather as a boon for the Democrats.
The disagreement of the parties on the tariff was
indicated in the platforms.

The Democrats took the following

stand:
We reaffirm our belief in the doctrine
of a tariff for the purpose of providing
sufficient revenue for the operation of
the government economically administered,

41
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and unreservedly endorse the Underwood tariff as truly exemplifying that
doctrine. l
Whereas the Republican platform stated that "the Republican
party stands now, always has, ••• for the policy of tariff
protection to American industries and American labor ••• tt
It did not regard an anti-dumping provision as an adequate
substitute and also went on to say that the "Underwood
tariff act is a complete failure in every respect. tf2
The sharp opposition of these two positions, however, was somewhat softened by the recommendations on the
part of both parties for an advisory tariff commission that
would give impartial study to the matter and advise the administration accordingly.

Wilson, at first opposed to

such a board, admitted his change of opinion on the subject
as early as January, 1916, in an address to the Railway
Business Association in New York City.

He spoke of the

"economic revolution" going on in the world, and therefore
the necessity for a more thorough investigation of conditions than Congress was capable of because of its other preby taking this position of favoring
occupying concerns. 3
a board, Wilson stole some of the thunder from the oppositio

1 Democratic Convention, 122.
2 Republican Convention, 168.
3 Shaw, 156-157.
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When, moreover, Wilson signed the measure for a Tariff Commission in the very heat of the campaign on September 8, 1916
and then secured as chairman, Frank William Taussig, long
distinguished at Harvard as a low economist, "there was implicit in this move", according to Paxson, "a Democratic
willingness to accept the protective system as reasonable.,,4
Naturally, the Republicans criticized the President's shift of opinion, but even more did Hughes, beginning
with his acceptance speech, attack the whole tariff program.
In almost every city of the West in which he campaigned
Hughes gave some

ti~e

to this issue.

The people of Tacoma,

Portland, Coeur D'Alene, San Francisco and Los Angeles, - all
heard Hughes speak 'against the tariff. 5

Yet the Republican

papers in these same cities after the election attributed
very little importance to this issue, and we fail to see why
the people at large would favor the return of a protectionist policy.
This matter of the tariff had taken on importance
in the last twenty years.

In the Congressional elections of

1890 and 1910, the tariff question was about the only issue
upon which the parties really differed.

In 1890, following

4 Paxson, 352.
5 2sn Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 15, 16, 1916.
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the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act, the Republicans
suffered defeat, a phenomenon repeated again in 1910 subsequent to the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909.
These results would seem to indicate that when this issue was
presented without complication from others the popular verdict
was against the stubborn maintenance of a rigid protectionist policy.6

The depression that followed the crisis of 1907

and continued after the passage of the tariff bill of 1909
certainly did not enhance the position of the protectionist
Republicans.
Moreover, this turn from a prosperity, which the
Republicans attributed to their protectionist policy, to a
state of depression, was naturally a plausible opportunity for
the Democrats in turn to attribute the depression also to this
policy.

However, the Democrats strengthened their appeal to

the people by linking the high cost of living with the protective tariff.

It was under the influence of these circum-

stances, Taussig thought, that the Republicans went down to
defeat in the Congressional elections of 1910, and, together
with the party split to the rout in the Presidential race of
1912.7

That the Democratic power was on the rise cannot be

-

6 Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff history of the United States,
Putnam's funs, 1923, 409.
7 Ibid., 412.
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denied.

It is best seen perhaps by a glance at the following

tables:
61st Congress, 1909-1911 (that which passed
the tariff act of 1909):
Senate, 60 Rep.
House, 214 Republicans
175 Democrats
32 Dem.
62nd Congress (1911-1913):
House, 228 Democrats
165 Republicans
1 Socialist

Senate, 51 Rep.
43 Dem.

63rd Congress (1913-1915) that which passed
the tariff act of 1913:
House, 286 Democrats
Senate, 51 Dem.
122 Republicans
44 Rep. 8
1 Prog.
21 Progressives,
Prog.Rep. ,
and Indep.
~ihen

this surge of power brought Wilson to the

Presidency in 1912 the Democrats lived up to their platform
promise and under Wilson's leadership quickly engineered the
composition and passage of the Underwood Tariff in 1913 which
provided for a general reduction of tariff rates.

In his ac-

ceptance speech of,1916, Wilson referred to this revision,
saying, "the tariff has been revised, not on the principle
of repelling foreign trade, but upon the princIpal of encouraging it. tl9
It is hard to see how the tariff could have been
made the main issue of the coming election unless Wilson's
present administration had been accompanied by a great
8 Ibid., 412.
9 Shaw, 305.
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depression, and this was nowhere in evidence.

Trade with the

belligerents was bringing money into the country.

Since there

was a comparatively enjoyable prosperity, one is surprised to
find that Hughes did not leave this issue entombed in the
black print of the platform.

However, it can be said that

issues were scarce, as the Socialists pointed out, and the
tariff probably helped Hughes to retain the votes of the conservative East.

But the important votes of this campaign were

those of the Progressives, and such a traditional policy as
the protective tariff would hardly be enough to win their
vote.

In an editorial after the election, the New York Times

spoke very critically of this issue, saying that "the Republicans had no issues, no clear policies except protection, a
scarecrow hung out at the eleventh hour, and inciting only
guffaws. HlO

Although we need not go as far as the Times in

our condemnation of this issue of the campaign, it probably
lost no votes for Wilson except in those states of the East
that had already been conceded to the Republicans.
Another issue stressed a great deal by Hughes from
convention time to election was Wilson's partisanship in appointing Democrats to office in place of more capable and
skilled men.

This issue was hardly important enough to swing

an election because it was only a perennial favorite with the
10 New York Times, November 11, 1916.
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challenger.

Besides the American people seem to concede the

principle that to the victor belongs a certain reasonable
amount of the spoils; or as Bryan retorted to Hughes' accusations, tithe deserving Democrat" is as much entitled to
ll
recognition as a deserving Republican.
However, that the
matter was definitely controversial was indicated by Outlook,
which favored the Republicans in this regard and pointed out
that even Wilson's legislation could not "make up for the
fundamental corruption of an administrative system by the
reintroduction of the spoils system. ,,12
It seems that Wilson was probably guilty in this
case for two of his biographers, who are usually favorable
to him, admit his guilt.

David Lawrence, one of these

biographers, thought that in Wilson's administration
••• ambassadors were selected and governmental jobs of various sorts dispersed in
panicky haste to satisfy the demands of the
party vultures. Patronage was like so much
debris ••• that had to be cleared away •••
The disregard of a civil service reform and
the appointment of some men to ambassadorial
or ministerial posts who would never have
been sent as first secretaries even, had
there been the slightest suspicion that a
war was brewing in Europe, constituted an
indefensible chapter of the first part of

11 Literary Digest, 53:9, August 26, 1926.
12 Outlook, CXIV, October 4, 1916.
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the Wilson administration. 13
Dodd, another biographer, also says that Wilson did not handle
the question of civil service any too well.
Wilson, although fully aware of the risks,
allowed many diplomatic, consular, and
other positions to be awarded to party
workers. And Democratic leaders in Congress more than once enacted legislation
that tended to debauch the civil service. 14
However, Dodd also points out that, although this difficulty
of patronage arose between the President and his party in both
houses of Congress throughout the administration, "as the
matter stood when the campaign opened the administration had
as good a record as any of its predecessors; one is constrained
to say a better one. u15
Among the appointments criticized two immediately
oome to mind mainly because of the publicity given by Hearst
to everything negative connected with the Mexican affair.
During the Mexican crisis William Bayard Dale, an unfrocked
clergyman and newspaper writer, was selected by Wilson as a
personal representative to investigate conditions.
Not only
was he temperamentally unsuited 16 but actually ignorant of
the mission assigned to him.

13 David Lawrence, The

~

Doran Co., 1924,~5.
14 Dodd, 181.
15 Ibid., 182.
16 Baker, IV, 265.

Soon after another representaStory of Woodrow Wilson, New York,
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tive was selected to deal with Huerta and this appointment
was just as bad.

John Lind, Bryan's personal friend and the

former Governor of Minnesota, chosen as the new mediator, was
completely unfamiliar with Latin American affairs and untried
in diplomatic circles.

These facts, together with his in-

ability to speak Spanish, made

hi~

the most unfit person who

could have been sent. 17
Another appointment under attack by Hughes was one
made by Secretary of the Treasury, McAdoo, who had removed
Henry Clapp

as~

assistant appraiser of merchandise at the Port

of New York to make way for Daniel E. Finn, a Tammany district
leader, whom Hughes claimed was unfit and unqualified. 18
With regard to two other publicized cases, the independent
Springfield Republican said that the two parties were even.
While a Mister Durand had been removed from public office
against his will by the Administration, a Doctor Titman had
resigned voluntarily for reasons of health from the post of
the Superintendent of the Coast and Geodetic Survey.19
Although there were many more dubious appointments
these few most publicized cases are sufficient to indicate
17 Charles W. Thompson, Rresidents I've Known and Two Near
Presidents, Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1929, 26I:
18 San Frgncisco Chronicle, August 13, 1916.
19 Literary Digest, 53:9, August 26, 1916.
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that Hughes had found a chink in the armor of Wilson's administration.

It led to many speeches by Hughes on ineffi-

ciency of government, waste of money, and particularly partisanship and sectionalism in politics that resulted in putting
incompetent men into important positions.

But whether Wil-

son was guilty or not, whether Hughes gained votes or not, it
still must be recognized as one of the major issues made by
the Republicans.

Worthy of notice too is the fact that while

it might have accounted for the' closeness of the race it
could not have aided Wilson in any way in winning the election.
Another important thrust against Wilson was made
by the Republicans on the subject of foreign policy.

hughes

launched a critical attack in his very speech of acceptance
in which he devoted more than half of his time to this subject.

In his attacks he consistently hammered at the Mexican

policy which, indeed, at that time and perhaps even today,
appeared to be another sore spot in the Wilson administration.

Unfortunately, Wilson was unprepared for the task of

foreign relations with Mexico as he had himself admitted,
stating that, "it would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs when
my own preparations had been exclusively with domestic
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problems. tt20

Yet in spite of his insight into his own limita-

tions, he nevertheless refused the advice of authorities on
important matters, selected a cabinet of inexperienced politicians, and flung himself into the very depths of foreign entanglements from the very beginning, as his Mexican diplomacy
conclusively shows. 21
Briefly the situation in Mexico developed as follows.
When Diaz, the dictator of Mexico for thirty-five years, yielded to a revolutionary movement that he could no longer suppress, Madero was installed as constitutional President in
1911, but he did not keep order nor did he satisfy the aspirations of the landless peons.

A counter-revolution of land-

owners, supported by foreign investors, displaced him and installed Victoriana Huerta as President.

Great Britain and most

of the powers promptly recognized Huerta's government but Wilson refused to do the same, despite the cries of the business
interests in this country.
"ilatchful waiting" was the policy adopted by Wilson.
Unfortunately, with this policy he was impliCitly encouraging
revolution.

The revolutions were supposed to convince Huerta,

a character most obnoxious to Wilson, that he should abandon
20 Baker, IV, 247.
21 Ibid., 344.
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his high ambitions and retire.

Pressure from foreign coun-

tries forced Wilson to hurry the process and so he sent two
poorly equipped ambassadors who failed to gain their objectives.

The repeal of the canal tolls exemption clause by Con-

gress, an act done at Wilson's request, brought England to
Wilson's side and encouraged him in his watchful waiting.
Huerta, however, continued negotiations with the foreign powers and Wilson decided to lift the arms embargo for the benefit of the constitutional forces, which meant that Villa and
Carranza would now receive munitions openly from the United
States.
The Tampico incident and the ABC mediation brought
a brief respite, but soon Carranza, Villa, and Zapeta were
taking turns in overrunning Mexico City.

The mediation of

South American countries was again invited, and this time after conferences of these countries with Secretary of State
Lansing, the Carrancista party by some strange process of
reasoning was chosen as the only party possessing the essentials for recognition as the de facto government.

The United

States then recognized Carranza as the chief executive of
Mexico, and Wilson simultaneously

procla~

an embargo on arms

to Mexico, except for the newly organized government.
Villa's reaction, the murder of 16 American engineers, brought more trouble, but when armed intervention was
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recommended, Wilson preferred to take Carranza1s worthless
promise that he would pursue justice in this case. 22

When

Villa continued raids upon New Mexico, Wilson called out the
militia to pursue Villa into Mexican territory.

Carranza ap-

peared cooperative at first, but then he definitely refused
our soldiers .the use of all Mexican transportation facilities;
his next step was a bitter condemnation of American invasion
on Mexican soil as "a move that could easily lead to war.,,23

In June war was almost declared when several clashes occurred
between some men of Pershing ' s command and Ihexicans at Parral,
and a collision with a force of Carranza's troops at Carrizal.
The United States President was still determined to
keep peace and so adopted Lansing's suggestion of a joint
Mexican-American commission to reach an understanding.

The

net result of the New London Conference was a victory for
Mexican diplomacy; the withdrawal of American troops from Mexi
can territory; the restoration of full diplomatic relations
between the two countries; and the decision to patrol the
borders rigorously against further raids.

These events bring

us to the closing month of the campaign.
Then as now, to many Wilson's policy was the
22 Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United
States, Harcourt, Bruce & Co., New York, 1943, 181.
23 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States,Government Printing Press, Washington, 1913, 486.
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combination of delayed recognition and meddling in Mexico's
internal affairs, while to others it was an example of remarkable patience, unselfishness and sincerity that paved
the way for his moral leadership of Europe. 24

Some will

point to the four hundred American civilians killed in Mexico
or to the one hundred and seventy million dollars lost to
American businessmen. 25

Wilson's defenders, however, will

say that his refusal to be forced into war with Mexico saved
many more lives, made unnecessary prolonged policing measures, and did much to remove the suspicion with which our
policies in the Caribbean were regarded by our southern
neighbors.
With regard to the recognition of Huerta, Wilson
was criticized by some for departing from the traditional
course of the United States of recognizing de facto governments.

The easiest and wisest course, they claim, would

have been to grant recognition to the Huerta government and
leave to Huerta and the Mexicans the solution of their
problems of constitutional law and democracy.

The policy

adopted by Wilson, however, was one that introduced moral
considerations into the realm of international law, a
24 J. Latane & O. Wainhouse, American Foreign Policy, Odyssey
Press, New York, 1940, 602.
25 Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United, States, Henry
Holt, New York, 542-543 (cf. footnotes).
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dangerous procedure since it placed upon the U.S. the responsibility of deciding which government was moral and of
establishing that government.
It is not our purpose here to decide which course
would have been best in the Mexican crisis for that would demand a long and comprehensive study of a question that is
still among the unsolved problems of history.

However, the

above facts are necessary to show upon what grounds the Republicans based their attack.
While Hughes and Lodge recommended intervention in
the Mexican crisis, Hughes in his acceptance speech merely
denounced Wilson's tlvacillation" and demanded a "new policy"
without specifying what it should be. 26

This attitude was

rather typical of the rest of his campaign speeches.

Hughes

claimed that Wilson should have insisted upon protection of
the lives and property of American citizens.

If Huerta and

his government could not discharge this function, then the
U. S. should not have recognized him but instead our administration said to Huerta, ttyou, get
was given to Carranza.

out~"

and recognition

The attack of some Mexicans under

Villa that killed 19 Americans was war, and yet we allowed
the Mexicans to spill blood, coquetted with Villa, with

26

New York Times, August 1, 1916.
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Carranza.

The administration was also to blame for the

anarchy that prevailed in Mexico, for leaving our citizens a
prey to the ravages of revolution, and for making our name
word of contempt in a riotous republic.

a

tilt was a miserable,

petty war brought about by weakness and ignorance, by incompetence and blundering.,,27
It was probably very fortunate for President Wilson that the Mexican crisis abated somewhat a month or so before the election.

There was a decided number of Americans

clamoring for intervention and they were not only the warhawks and the believers of the jingoistic press but a number
of people usually pacifistic in outlook.

The Roman Catho-

lics were also a sizeable minority who disagreed with Wilson's maneuverings.

Even the rviexicans were not sold on the

President's 'watchful waiting', at least if one can believe
an article in Outlook magazine just before the election that
contained condemnations of Wilson by First Chief Carranza,
the Secretary of War Obregon, the Mexican Secretary of
Foreign Relations Aguilar, and a leading general of the
army.28 Few papers expressed the convictions of the Springfield Republicans that "it is impossible not to have faith
27 ~iterarY Diyest~ 53: 8 , August 19, 1916.
utlook, CL V, ~ovember 1, 1915.

28
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that President Wilson is still on the right track and facing
in the right direction." 29
At any rate, how this issue of the Mexican policy
affected the election is a question difficult to answer.

It

could have been one of the main reasons for the closeness of
the contest.

One reason that inclines us to believe this was

that the aggressive

and openly hostile attitude of the Catho-

lic papers unified when Wilson expressed his fondness for the
anti-clerical Carranza and even aided him with military supplies.

Catholic blood flowing in the streets of Mexico stirre

the sympathies of American Catholics to a distaste for Wilson
and his policy.

However, since Catholic criticism of Wilson

was found chiefly in Catholic newspapers and periodicals of
very limited circulation, the united stand of Catholics
against Wilson cannot be certain, especially when these few
organs of publicity were not unanimous in condemning voting
for Wilson.

That Tumulty was worried and even the President,

over the antagonism of the Church, and that he tried to placate its members, seems to be indicated by a letter of the
Roman Catholic Tumulty to an obligingly inquisitive friend;
for in this letter he attempted to explain away the whole

29 Current Opinion, LXI, No.3, September, 1916.
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Mexican persecution as an exaggeration.
However, the newspapers of the country seem to
give no importance to its part in the election except as a
verification of the Democratic slogan, tlHe kept us out of
war."

That Hughes' attacks upon Wilson's "meddling" brought

him any votes is almost impossible to prove, especially since
the papers concentrate upon what lost votes for the challenger rather than what gained votes for him.

At the most

we can say that the Republicans in the election of 1916
succeeded in making a major

iss~e

of Wilson's Mexican policy

but failed to make it a winning issue.
This brings to a close our brief discussion of the
major issues made by Hughes and the Republican party.

From

the general tenor of the issues it is easy to understand why
the post-election surveys blamed the Republicans and Hughes
for making the campaign predominately tfcritical tl rather than
constructive.

CHAPTER IV
THE WAR ISSUE: A DEMOCRATIC SUCCESS
The winning strategy of the Democrats centered upon
two policies: first, the President's successful prevention of
an American entrance into war despite the occasion for such a
course, and secondly, his indisputable record of progressive
legislationo

Though at times one or the other of these ele-

ments was stressed, it seems that the combination of both was
just too much for the Republicans.

Because of the importance

attributed by newspapers and authors to these two factors we
have limited our discussion to them as the main vote-getters
for the Democrats.

In our discussion we will emphasize their

special importance in the West because it was in the

,~-est

that

Wilson found the votes that tipped the scales ever so slightly
in his favor.

Since the contest was so close we will be look-

ing for elements in Wilson's favor, and this purpose, rather
than partiality to Wilson's cause, will determine the selection
of quotations.
Many commentators thought that the main issue of the
election was provided by the threatening war.

It certainly

accentuated our relations with the belligerent countries which
were proving to be an extremely difficult problem and as
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complicated in the early part of the war as was public opinion
in this melting pot of millions of hyphenated Americans, Wilson's early appeal on August 18, 1914, urging the American
people to be "impartial in thought as well as in action" was
asking the impossible.

A rhyme from the New York Sun gave

humorous expression to this not-tao-humorous and rather complex situation:
The barber to the right of me hoching for
the Kaiser,
The barber to the left of me was hacking
for the Czar.
A gentleman from Greece was shearing off
my fleece,
While very near a swart Italian ~stropped
his scimitar.
And when presently discussion, polyglot
and fervid,
On political conditions burst about my
chair,
I left the place unshaven - I hope I'm not
a craven
But I sort of like to wear a head beneath
my hair~l
Accordingly, the United States soon became a fertile field for the propagandists of the belligerents.

But as

early as November, 1914 in a poll conducted by the Literary
Digest, of the 367 editors who replied only 20 favored the Germans while 105 favored the Allies and 242 remained neutral.
This was even before the English propagandists launched their
1 C::uoted by Mark Sullivan, Our Times,
York, 1933, v, 140-141.

Scribner's Sons, New
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successful campaign in the United States. 2

In general, "the

sympathies of the Americans lay on the side of Great Britain,
France and the other allies.

Relations with Great Britain

had on the whole been friendly since the recent repeal of the
canal tolls exemption clause.,,3
were always partial to the French.

Then, too, the Americans
On the other hand, Ger-

man-American relations had not been particularly friendly
since the eighties and by 1914 the American people "had come
to regard German militarism and navalism as an international
menace."

Moreover, Uthe ruthless invasion of Belgium, des-

pite a solemn treaty obligation to respect her neutrality,
merely confirmed the deepest American suspicions."

And then

to make matters worse, "the German Chancellor blunderingly
explained that the Belgian neutrality was but a scrap of
paper. fl4

Needless to say big America sympathized with

little Belgium.
Despite this growing sentiment in favor of the
Allies, when convention time arrived before the 1916 election
both parties advocated neutrality in their respective platforms, together with the firm defense of American rights.
2 See J. D. Squires, British Propaganda at Home and in the
United States from 1914-1212; Carl Wittke, German-Americans
and the World War; Peterson, Propaganda i l l ~~ar.
3 Bailey, £R.cit., b12.
4 Ibid., 612.
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This seemed the wisest policy because the American people
still preferred peace and had not as yet been completely
turned against either side.

At this point American desires

did not include a victory that involved American participation on the side of one of the belligerents.
Another factor made neutrality the more popular
policy.

As Baker points out:
One element or condition of the approaching campaign which was of the utmost importance ought to be here considered: this
was the relative lull in American diplomatic activity which began in ~ay, before
the conventions, and continued until after
the elections in November. It applies not
only to Europe but also to Mexico.
For
five months, while there were indeed irritating controversies, especially with the
British regarding the black list, no really
acute foreign crisis disturbed American
life or influenced opinion. It is only
in the after look that the immense political
importance can be fully recognized. The
campaign so far as the slogan "He kept us
out of w~r" was concerned largely turned
upon it.,
Preparedness was also a major plank in both plat-

forms for this policy had been brought before the people by
the many preparedness parades of May and June.

Tumulty

claimed that they were part of a political movement led by
Wood, to mention one, to embarrass the President and Congress
into passing some radical legislation. 6

5 Baker, 242.
6 Tumult
246-247.

Be that as it may,
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the number of people taking part in these parades was in six
figures and that in New York was described as "the greatest
civilian demonstration in the history of the world."

As

the political importance of these parades was more obvious
to Tumulty than to the President, it was by Tumulty's maneuvering that the President not only was invited but also took
part in the parade at Washington, marching at its head on
the very day that the Democratic convention was meeting in St
Louis.

"By getting into the 'front line,' the President,

argued Tumulty, had c1:uerly outwitted his enemies and took
command of the forces in the country demanding preparedness. 1I7
Wilson made other appropriate gestures toward the
more militant elements in the country with the preparedness
measures that were pushed through Congress dur:l.ng the few
months previous to the election.

The National Defense Act

of June 23 enlarged the regular army to 175,000, strengthened
the National Guard, and provided tor an officer's reserve
corps.

The Naval Appropriations Bill of August 29, author~

ized the construction of a large number of new dreadnoughts,
battle cruisers, and minor warcraft; and since the Democratic
party was likewise converted to building up the Merchant
Marine, the United States Shipping Board Act of September 7th
7 Ibid., 247.
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appropriated fifty million dollars for the purchase or construction of merchant ships.

Finally to coordinate in-

dustries and resources for defense, Congress created a Council of National Defense, consisting of six cabinet members
and an advisory board drawn from the ranks of industry and
labor.

That these measures were not adequate nor

of the

radical type that Tumulty had feared, need not concern us
here.

It is more to the point to note that they were enough

to placate the midly militant Americans who demanded the protection of American lives on the high seas, and likewise
enough to enable the Democrats to boast of a program that
embraced both preparedness and neutrality.

For "had the

Democrats attempted to run on a straight pacifist platform
they would almost certainly have been defeated. 8
The slogan, ttH.e kept us out of war," proved to be a "safe means of
tapping the powerful sentiment for peace without too far
alienating the war hawks. tt9
The Republican party strategists had refused to
make an issue out of the threatening war by nominating
Roosevelt or Wood, and wisely so because they realized that
the country still wanted peace.

But now that their platform

practically agreed with the Democrats on the issue they

8 Millis, 320.
9 IQiQ.., 320.
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could only denounce Wilsonian "weakness" in maintaining
American rights abroad, and even then they had to be careful because they were straddling the affections of both the
English and the German-Americans.

They were, as someone

phrased it, "beating drums up both streets;" hence their
platform also blazed with nationalistic fervor, giving offense to no one.
Hughes' acceptance speech fell right in line with
the platform.

He spoke of "America first and America efri

cient" and dedicated himself to the "unflinching maintenance of all American rights on land and sea."

He stressed

a "firm American policy" but the obvious question was immediately asked by the hostile Democratic papers, - "What
does 'firm' mean?ulO

An independent paper, the Springfield

Republican, was quoted by the Digest as giving a "careful
criticism" of the speech.

After reviewing Mr. Hughes'

condemnation of President Wilson's policy with reference to
the European war the paper asked:
What would Mr. Hughes do with reference to the European war, in case he were
to be elected? Would he join one side or
the other?
Would he forthwith demand
specific disavowal from Germany of the
Lusitania's sinking?
Would he threaten

10 New York Viorld, August 1, 1916
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England with reprisals on account of
the blockade? No one would know from
this speech what Mr. Hughes would do, but
we do know with sufficient precision what
to expect of President Wilson. ll
Throughout most of the campaign speeches Hughes
seemed to follow this course, that is, he offered no alternative to the policy of Wilson but advocated the same thing
in a more vfirm u way.

He constantly criticized and con-

demned Wilson's missteps.

Both he and the other Republicans

found fault witn Wilson not for keeping us out of war but
for doing so by methods which were humiliating in the extreme, sacrificed national honor and surrendered its position as the defender of its own rights and the rights of
neutrals in the face of flagrant wrongs against which the
President had protested - on paper.
It was a very delicate position for Hughes
especially when one of his colleagues, Theodore Roosevelt,
was speaking in a fashion much more aggressive.

Roose-

veltfs hatred of Wilson led him into undignified outbursts
and to extremities of statement that were irrjtating and embarrassing to Hughes and his managers,12 for implicit at
least was the suggestion that we should have gone to war.
11 Literary Digest, 53:7, August 12, 1916.
12 Baker, 289 (footnote).
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The Colonel's attacks upon the foreign policy of the administration were violent and persistent.

He characterized the

statement 'He kept us out of war' as an "Utterly misleading
phrase, the phrase of a coward, and distorted it into a promise that under no circumstances could we go to war." 13

lie

also declared that if he had been president when the Lusitania
was sunk, he would have seized every German vessel interned in
Amepican waters. 14

But the speech that was perhaps the climax

of tte Colonel's outbursts and of his campaigning was given at
Cooper Union in New York on November 3rd.

As he reached the

end of his flaming speech, Mr. Millis notes that "he tossed his
manuscript aside and trembling with emotion uttered the soul
cry of the true patriot:" 1 5
There should be shadows now at Shadow
Lawn: (Wilson's Summer home) the shadows
of the men, women and children who have
risen from graves in foreign lands; the
shadows of the helpless whom Mr. Wilson
did not dare protect lest he might have
to face danger: the shadows of babies
gasping pitifully as they sink under the
waves; the shadows of women outraged and
slain by bandits ••• Those are the shadows
proper for Shadow Lawn; the shadows of
deeds that were never done; the shadow of

i~;t~h:~~~~ ~~a~h:e~~r{~;!~W~~a~:lgo
13
14
15
16

New York Times, October 11, 1916.
Ibid., October 1, 1916.
Millis, 349.
New York Times, November 4, 1916.
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Speeches such as this seemed to put hughes in an impossible
situation.

Like Wilson he knew the sentiment of

it did not want war.

t~e

country:

How could he then, or the Republican

managers, approve the incendiary proposals of Roosevelt, who
was going up and down the country insisting that "the time for
the ostrich policy, the time for the head-in-a-hole policy, in
America is past~"l?
Wilson capitalized on the situation, and in a speech
at Shadow Lawn on September 30th he said:

"The certain pros-

pect of the success of tee Republican party is that we shall be
drawn in one form or another into tte embroilments of the
European War."18

As if to prove it, Roosevelt, campaigning

for Hughes at Battle Creek on that very day was shouting:
"President Wilson by his policy of tame submission to insult
and injury from all whom he feared, has invited the murder of
our men, women and children by ••• German submarines at sea.,,19
It was said that the Democrats "cheerfully reprinted this
passionate effusion and spread it broadcast over the radicalpacifist Northwest. tt20

It was a commitment of the Republi-

cans to war in event that the German pledge on submarine warfare was broken.
17
18
19
20

-

Ibid., October 10, 1916
Ibid., October 1, 1916
Ibid.
MITTis, 343.
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A few days before the campaign ended Hughes added a
statement indicative perhaps of his fear of the effect of
Roosevelt's speeches:

itA vote for me is not a vote for war.

It is a vote for lasting peace, it is a vote for the maintenance of American rights on land and sea, throughout the
world.,,21

Late in the campaign Hughes was also forced to give

his views upon two important incidents involving America.

One

expression of opinion was forced by a heckler who put the
. question to Hughes point-blank: "What would you have done when
the Lusitania was sunk?"

Hughes answered:

••• when I said 'strict accountability'
every nation would have know that that was
meant; and further when notice was published with respect to the action, I would
have made it known in terms unequivocal
and unmistakable, that we should not tolerate
a continuance of friendly relations through
the ordinary diplomatic channels if that
action were taken, an~ the Lusitania would
never have been sunk. 2
This, Baker claimed, "was the one important respect in which
Hughes said that he would have taken a more advanced step than
the President."23
On the issue of nblack-1isting" and the violation of
property it seems that Hughes, despite the criticism of Wilson's methods, agreed with him.

On October 9th he said:

21 New fork Times, October 1, 1916.
22 Ibid., October 13, 1916.
32 Baker, 288.
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I do not put life and property on the
same footing ••• We do not propose to
tolerate any improper interference with
Americ.an property, with American mails, or
with legitimate commercial intercourse. No
American who is exercising only American
rights shall be put on any black list by any
foreign nation. 24
The open struggle of the Wilsonian administration to
maintain neutrality could carry no pledge of non-participation,
and Wilson, neither before or after his nomination, promised
more than an effort to avoid war.

Indeed, as early as May 30,

Wilson had made it clear that he was no doctrinaire pacifist.
Everyone understood that war at times was necessary and beneficial.

"The Union was saved by the processes of the Civil

War" 25

and America while passionately desirous of peace,

might have to fight again. 26

This attitude, however, was

wholly different from militarism which he did not care to find
prevalent in America. 27
Little else, however, was said for the President than
that he kept the nation out of war.

But, "it was certainly

never the President's intent to rest the most important phase
of his record - his attitude toward the European War - upon thi
naive generality ••• "28

Of course, Wilson was aware of the

implication of the phrase and he gave indications that he did
not like the phrase, even though he could not object to it.
24 New York Times, October 10, 1916.

~~ ~~~~~n~n~4bodd,
28 ~r' ~ .

IV, 194.
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Once he remarked to Secretary Daniels:
country out of war.
Then he added:

They talk

"I can't keep the

of me as though I were a god."

"Any little German lieutenant can put us into

the war at any ti;ne by some calculated outrage. tl2 9

If the

country had been plunged into war this campaign phrase could
easily have backfired and blasted his hopes of reelection.
To the people this phrase seemed to mean that Wilson
was earnestly and honestly seeking to keep out of war.

His

heSitation, his continued and determined efforts for peace,
his mental debates, seemed to express the mind of a good percentage of the American people.

Besides the mention in his

speeches of his avoidance of war he often referred to the
moral leadership of America in this crisis, to the impossibility of isolation in the future, and to the League of Nations, but it is very doubtful that these ideas were appreciated by the people at large.

The slogan seemed to be the

all-important part of the Democratic stand on the war issue
and that they relied upon its appeal is seen in appeals such
as the following just before the election:
You are WORKING
- Not Fighting
Alive and Happy
- Not Cannon Fodder~

29 Baker, 258.
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Wilson and Peace with Honor?
or
Hughes with Roosevelt and war?30
Every reference to

t~is

slogan and to peace carried a

conscious allusion to what the policies of Theodore Roosevelt
and the Republicans might have brought to pass had he been in
the White House.

When the Republicans criticized his foreign

policy Wilson had a tactical advantage, for his policy had already been tried and any radical change would only lead to war.
Obviously this was not a necessary outcome of a Republican victory but the Democrats played upon the people's alarm to enhance their own chance of winning.
Thus were the cards stacked on the war issue.

Only a

general outline has been given because a detailed accowlt of
all the prewar events and diplomatic relations was thought unnecessary for our purposes here.

It seemed sufficient to note

the stand of the parties, and the strategy employed.

The one

party could stand a successful record in keeping the country
out of war, could point to an all-important slogan and could
imply that a change might mean war.

The other party was

forced to criticize a policy of peace, had no catchy slogan, an
seemed to be weakened by the militant speeches of one of its
prominent members who worked almost at cross-purposes witn the
challenging candidate.
30

~ ~

Times, November 4, 1916 (Paid advertisement)
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We are not surprised, then, to see the following caption on one of the leading articles in the New

Yor~

Times on

November 12: "Peace a Powerful Issue - 'He Kept Us Out Of War'
Won Women ••• was the greatest argument, East and V.:est, but
especially the West.

In the West it appealed to hatred of war,

in the midwest to pacifism.,,3 1

That the people voted Wilson

because of the war issue was the opinion of the San Francisco
Bulletin and Chronicle.32

The San Jose M.ercury Herald

thought "that the slogan swung states usually Republican" like
New Hampshire 33

and the Sacramento Union claimed the tlcall of

humani ty impelled the West to vote for Vdlson" and his policy
of peace. 34

The Los Angeles Express and the Spokane Spokes-

man attributed importance to the slogan, while the Seattle
Post-Intelligencer gave top-rank influence to the appeal of the
slogan to women.35

This same attitude was shown in the mid-

western Wilsonian states:

In Kansas by the Emporia Gazette and

Wichita Beacon and in Minnesota by the Duluth News Tribune.36
The lone Wilson state in New England, New nampshire, attributed
second largest influence to the slogan; while "Independent" (Ear
per's Weekly) a week after the election said that the prime
31 New I2rk Times, November 12, 1916.
32 San Francisco Bulletin and the San Francisco Chronicle,
November 10, 11, 1916.
---33 San Jose Mercury-Herald, November 9, 1916.
34 Sacramento Union, November 10, 1916.
35 Literary Digest, 53:21, November 18, 1916.
36 Ibid.
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element apparent in the election returns was the approval by
the country of the President's success in "keeping us out of
war. tt36a

From these comments it appears that
The closing wee~~s of the canvass clarified
the antithesis between the neutrality that
Wilson cherished and its only alternative,
which was war. It made him votes that he
was not a swashbuckler, and he needed all
of them to overcome the normal Republican
drift.37
The domination of the war motive is easily understood

if an article of the Literary Digest just before the election
was an indication of what the American people were thinking
about.

Entitled "What the War is Costing in Men," it was set

off by a drawing of a

~orrent

of dead bodies going over the

waterfalls of war; the caption was "The Ceaseless Torrent".
Included in the article were the sobering figures of the war
dead.

The count at that time was 711,000 deaths. 38

The ef-

fect of this article upon women readers served to heighten the
importance of the Democratic slogan.
When looking for influential factors that went hand
in hand with this war issue we cannot overlook the work of
Bryan, for apart from the South, the Wilson majorities came
mainly from the territory in which Bryan did his campaigning
36a Independent, 88:3546, November 4, 1916.
37 Paxson, 263-4.
38 Literary Digest, 53:19, November 4, 1916.
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for Wilson.

"This campaigning took Mr. Bryan through nineteen

states in eight weeks, during which time he made four or five
speeches a day."39

This last statement takes on greater sig

nificance when we add two remarks made by the San Jose Mercury
herald to the effect that probably no one had "larger or more
appreciative audiences" than Bryan and that "the one issue
which appealed to his tender sensibilities was that of peace!'4
Even the Post of far-eastern Boston speaks of Bryan as the deciding factor in the Nebraska vote. 4l

At any rate it seems

more than a mere coincidence that only one of the states covered by Bryan went Republican. 42
As someone said of him,
nhis mood is the mood of the West."

And when he added his

oratorical ability to this sympathetic attitude toward the
western people, stressing that the President should not be rebuked 'for keeping the country out of war with Ivlexico and
Europe, and playing upon the important slogan, we can feel
reasonably sure that the vote of many western8:'s was influenced
by Bryan.

The Chicago Tribune thought that Bryan "was more

responsible for Wilson than he was four years ago," but having
the Tribune on one's side is no help so we'll forget their
39 P. Hibben, William Jennings Bryan, Farrar & Rinehart,
New York, 1929, 354.
40 San Jose Mercury-Herald, November 16, 1916.
41 Boston Post, November 11, 1916
42 Hibben, ibid., 354.
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remark.

However, we will note that Woodrow Wilson himself

seemed to attribute a great deal to Bryan from the following
acknowledgment:
May I not say how much I admire your
part in the campaign and what a vast deal
of effective work you seem to have done
in the very part of the country which
has now aligned itself with the forces
of progress. I think that all Democra~~
are grateful to you.
Certainly I am. j
The few representative newspapers quoted were
selected from the west because of its recognized importance
in the reelection of Wilson.

The Literary Digest in making

its poll of the various Republican editors likewise concentrated upon the j,est and midwest.

Thus far we have seen

that the facts and a cross-section of opinions indicate that
the war issue with its effective slogan was a very important
factor in the Democratic victory.

We will now consider the

other predominant factor in Wilson's favor, at least in the
western states, and that is, his successful bid for the
Progressive vote.

43 Ibid., 354.

CHAPTER V
THE DEMOCRATIC APPEAL TO THE PROGRESSIVES
By adding the Republican and the Progressive votes
of 1912 Justice Hughes appeared certain of victory.

Theoret-

ically the union of the two was very possible but we1ve seen
that the Progressives had almost a nostalgic devotion to
Teddy Roosevelt and when he refused to run and supported the
candidacy of Hughes, many of his followers were sadly disappointed, others angry.

During their convention the Pro-

gressives had summarily refused to nominate Hughes, and when
after the convention they were called in special session to
endorse him whole-heartedly, the request proved impossible.
That their allegiance was divided is evident from the results
of the election.
The Democratic administration, on the other hand,
had to hold tight to the votes that were consistently Democratic and pick up its working majority from other sources.
This was to be done by attracting the votes of political independents and Republicans who for some reason or other were
dissatisfied.

The Republicans boasted a unified front but

the break with the Progressives was obviously not healed for
as the North American phrased it, "the Progressives who left

-
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party four years ago have no more affection or
Thus the
veneration for it now than they had had then."3 8
~epublican

Democrats knew where to look for the necessary notes.

By earl

June, even before the Republican and Progressive conventions
had met, the Democratic leaders had settled upon the two
broad policies by which they would appeal to the people.

We

have seen how in the knowledge that the country was opposed to
war, they offered the record of the administration in keeping
out of it.

The country was still progressive; as the other

policy they would offer the record of the Wilson administration in progressive legislation in their belief that Wilson
would even continue to advocate more legislation of this type
in the brief period before the close of Congress.
Before the Democratic convention met in June,
Colonel House had written to Wilson, tlNow that Hughes is the
candidate, it is all the more necessary for us to gather in
the Progressive vote.

I think that we can show Hughes up as

a thorough conservative. tl 39

From the beginning of the cam-

paign, House insisted that the Democrats must work to capture
the Independent vote and the Progressives of the West.

The

entire strategy was to be founded upon the principle of permitting the Republicans to spend their efforts and money on
38 Current Opinion, LXI, 2, August, 1916.
39 Seymour, I, 346, 347.
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the anti-Wilson states east of the Mississippi and north of
the Ohio, while the Democrats would hope to win the West,
which, with the South, would supply the necessary majority.40
Since the

Progres~ives

were aware of the appeal of

Wilson's record, those who returned to the Republican fold
realized that it must be discredited.

With this in mind, an

advertisement sponsored by the Republicans provides us with an
inSight into their tactics.

It was a two page article in the

Literary Digest appearing in late September that tried to
cover up the truth, at least so it appears to me.

It read:

"Wilson l s H-acord Should Make Every Progressive Vote For
Hughes. 1I

In the rest of the article the author, Gifford

Pinchot, a Progressive seems to ignore deliberately tae very
foundation of the Progressive platform, the social and economic issues, and rather concentrates on MeXico, and the civil
service reform. 41
This example was followed by another
Progressive, Charles Bonaparte, former Secretary of Navy and
after that Attorney General under Roosevelt when, in a similar
article entitled, "'\fihy I must Vote For Hughes; fI he, too, a ttacked Wilson primarily on civil service and his failure tO I
protect the constitutional rights of American citizens in
Mexico and Germany.42

But another Progressive who had bolted

40 Ibid., 347.
41 Literary Digest, 53: , Sept. 30, 1916.
42 Outlook, CXIV, October 11, 1916.
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the Republican party in 1912 was admittedly having trouble as
he turned to prepare his campaign speeches in behalf of the
Republican party.

It was no easy task for Albert Beveridge to

speak against Wilson, and his embarrassing position seems to
give the lie to Pinchot's outburst as well as mirror more correctly the difficult position of the Progressive.

As Bever-

idge said of himself:
He had long urged currency reform upon
his party without effect, and Wilson had
created the Federal Reserve System over Republican opposition. He had vainly sought
to interest his party and Mr. Roosevelt in
child-labor legislation and Wilson forced its
enactment •••• He had been the first in years
to fight for a tariff commission, and Wilson
had created one. He had proposed the establishment of a clearing house where business
men might learn their rights and find protection against unscrupulous competition and
Wilson had given them the Federal Trade Commission. He had bitterly denounced the tariff
lobby in 1909, and in 1913 Wilson literally
had scourged it from the Capitol. And if the
Underwood tariff did not meet with his approval, it more nearly accorded with his views
than the last Republican tariff act which he
had fought beroically.
Clearly, it was not
to be a simple matter to frame a militant
campaign against an administration with such
a record. 4j
This was a resume of Wilson's legislative record
which needs further amplification to show its appeal to the
Progressives.

Wilson's legislating had begun when the Under-

43 Claude Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, Literary
Guild, New York, 1932, 491.
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wood Tariff became a law in October, 1913.

As Mr. Beveridge

intimated, though it was not perfect, it was at least a decided improvement over the Wilson-Gorman and Payne-Aldrich
tariffs.

Currency reform providing for a new national banking

system was brought about by the Federal Reserve Act of December, 1913.

Then Wilson sought to fulfill the most emphatic

of the party pledges, "the enactment of such additional legislation as may be necessary to make it impossible for a private
monopoly to exist in the United States."44

Roosevelt had

failed to obtain such legislation from a recalcitrant Congress, and Taft had not even tried.

Wilson's efforts result-

ed in the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the
Clayton Anti-Trust Act.

The former authorized a commission

to investigate corporations engaged in interstate commerce,
all alleged violations of the anti-trust laws, and to issue
'cease and desist' orders against any corporation found guilty
of unfair methods of competition.

The latter was more sweep-

ing in its provisions:
It forbade rebates, tying contracts,
price di~criminations, price cutting to
restrain trade, the ownership of stock in
competing companies, and interlocking
directorates in banks and large businesses.

44 Democratic ~ ~, 1912, The Democratic National
Committee, New York, 6.
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Officers of corporations were made personally responsible. Competitors when
injured were allowed to use the injunction and to utilize evidence unearthed
by the government. 4 5
Mainly because the use of injunctions in labor disputes was
explicitly forbidden, it was hailed by Gompers as labor's
charter of freedom.
Other legislation not mentioned by Beveridge was
the Seaman's Act of 1915 which at least intended to do much
for the sailor's wellbeing and abolished the crime of desertion in the American Merchant Marine.

James Truslow

Adams remarked that this Act, together with the farm legislation, "at least showed a marked and proper interest in
the welfare of the ordinary man, instead of the larger business interests which had formerly considered the government
as rather peculiarly a perquisite of their own. rt46

More-

over, the Alaska Railway Act of 1914 provided for the construction, operation, and ownership of Alaskan railroads by
the Federal Government, and the Smi ttl-Lever Act of 1914 provided millions of dollars for farm demonstration work in
every rural county in the country.
45 E. Smith and S. Zurcher, Dictionary of American Politics,
Barnes and Noble, 1944, 57.
46 James Truslow Adams, History of the United States,
Scribners, New York, 1933, 198.
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These acts appealed to many Progressives in the same
way that they appealed to Beveridge.

Naturally they were un-

palatable to big business and conservative moneyed interests
who felt the challenge to their power and to their profits,
but they were staunch Republicans anyway so that their interests would remain unchanged.
This was only the legislation enacted before the cam
paign began.

But before we go on to the other important

legislation it would be well to take a glance at the rival
party, its platform and its candidate.

Noticeably lacking in

the Republican platform was the specific labor measures mentioned in the Democratic platform.

As Mr. Beveridge, the

Republican-Progressive-Republican, said to one of his colleagues: tlWhat has become of the wonderful platform, especiall
the economic features?

Has it all been abandoned for what you

say is now 'Americanism,' preparedness, and a protective tariff? u4 7

Together with the labor and economic omissions,

recommendations for farming legislation was a glaring omission
when compared with the excellent measures proposed by the
Democrats.

I mention this only because these omissions were

frequently commented upon by the Progressives during and after
the campaign.
47 Bowers, 489.
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The acceptance speec£l of hughes appealed no more
to the Progressives than did the Republican platform.

The

bpringfield Republican in summing up the speech reflected
this disappointment:
The impression one receives froin lVlr.
Hughes' notification speech is one of
solidity, and perhaps heaviness rather
than brilliancy. It is likely to appeal
to many of the Republican candidate's more
conservative supporters as a careful and
strong indictment of the present administration, with no display of flightiness or instability in the discussion of constructive policies. It seems les~ calculated to
satisfy the radical wing of the Republican
party, as the Progressives returning with
Mr. Roosevelt may be called. There is no
attention given to the policies of social
and industrial justice which were the backbone of the Progressive movement, while
there is little to suggest Rooseveltian
fervor and conviction in the discussion of
later issues of preparedness and Americanism. 48
President Eliot of Harvard, an impartial observer, voiced
somewhat the same criticisrr: in saying that it was "filled
with universally accepted statements concerning the proper
national policies and general descriptions of what ought to
be done and ought not to be done by national administrations.'
His comment that it was lacking in "exact measures tl could be

48 Literary Digest, 53:7, August 12, 337.
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said of Hughes' other campaign s~eeches.49
During the campaign Wilson had the great advantage
of being a President in power.

"He could act: he CQuld keep

the eyes cif the country constantly upon him."50

It was

easier, tco,'to win the Progressive vote in this position,
since the Progressive party was primarily interested in domestic affairs, and action on this score could convince them.
And Wilson did take advantage of this position.

His "record

for progressive legislation during that hot and hectic summer was as extraordinary as it was comprehensive. u51

In his

speech of acceptance he could well say: "We have in four
years come very near to carrying the platform of the Progressive party as well as our cwn; for we also are Progressives. n52

Since the campaign did keep Wilson and his achieve-

ments before the public eye and especially the Progressive
eye, it would seem well worthwhile to consider this legislation rather thoroughly.

It falls into two main categories,

farm and labor legislation.

The Federal Farm Loan Act,

though it really became law in May, is close enough to convention time to warrant our study.

It gains special import-

ance from the fact that the Republicans offered little to attract the farmer vote in the coming election.
49
50
51
52

Quoted by Houston, QQ.,cit. I, 214.
Baker, V, 263.
Ibid., 263.
Shaw, 308.

Thousands of
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America.,,54
The Federal Farm Loan Act was considered to be a
gesture to the farmer:
••• at the final passage in the House,
the bill was reinforced by the vocal support of one of the survivors of Populism,
Representative "CyclonE!' Davis, of Texas,
whose political career was based on his
unsurpaEsing skill in emitting a piercing
Tebel yell'. His noisy thankgsiving in
the House did not hurt the measure as a
gesture to the farm opinion. 55
In some quarters it was looked upon as a successful ending
of a battle of 15 years, waged by grangers and some banks of
the South and Middle West. 56

The poor financia~ status of

the farmer was a grievance long before the Populists gave it
voting strength.

The People's Party which had asked for

Federal storage facilities, easier credit and loans on farm
crops, was now getting all of these provisions in the Farm
Loan Act and they would not forget the President who put the
through.

Besides this Act there were the Cotton Futures Act

and the Grain Standard Act to obtain fair prices, and the
Permissive Warehouse Act which afforded storage facilities
for the farmers.
The Federal Farm Loan Act had provided for a Farm
Loan Board, and Wilson's appointments to this board durjng
54 Ibid.
55 Paxson, 352.
56 Lit. Dig., QQ.cit.
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the campaign gave great publicity to his work for the farmer
at an opportune time.

Four members were appointed to journey

from Maine to California "to determine the best means of
putting all the advantages of the system at the disposal of
the farmers.tI

To this end a thorough study of farm condi-

tions and farm-loan means was to be made in each state, and
witnesses at the hearing were to advise the board as to the
needs of the farmers, the extent to which they expected to
use the system, present difficulties in obtaining credit on
farm mortgages and the cost of loans, including interest and
commissions.

These specifications are mentioned in detail

because of the appeal they might have had to the farmer.
Besides all these measures for the farmer, the
previous years of Wilson's administration had seen many improvements which are recorded by the Secretary of
David Houston, in his book on the cabinet.

Agricultur~

Appropriations

for the support of the regular activities of the Department
of Agriculture had increased 50% from 24,100,000 to
36,130,000 dollars;during the First Administration the Department had created an Office of Information which simplified the farmer's bulletin, and facilitated circulation of
farming news; it encouraged farm demonstration; it provided
the Educational Extension Act, and an organization was created to supervise inves,tigational work in rural finance and
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marketing. 57

If only half of these measures had pro-

duced favorable results we can imagine the effect upon the
farmer.

Naturally, we cannot measure accurately the effect

upon the farmers' vote, but at least we can show that the
Democrats appeared in the role of benefactors who offered
them greater hope of prosperity and improvement.
Farmers are acutely conscious of their economic
interests; perhaps more than any other group in the population they know where their economic interests lie.
they vote their economic interests.

And

In the recent 1948

election, President Truman, a farm boy himself, knew all
thiS, and so was quick to point out that the falling wheat
and livestock prices of the last few months were due to the
influence of a probable Republican victory.

The Republi-

can candidate, Thomas Dewey, did not convince the farmers
that he would continue the price support program, and the
Republican-minded farmers failed to support him just as the
failed to support Hughes in 1916.

In the 1916 election the

farmers were enjoying a comparative prosperity since farm
prices were high and the tendency in such circumstances is
to leave well enough alone, as some Republican and Socialist papers pointed out afterwards. 58

57 Houston, I, 199-210.
58 Literary Digest, November 14, 1916.
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could well have been the deciding factor for the Republican
northwest farmer, thus giving the margin of 200 votes in
Minnesota, 3500 in Oregon, 2750 in South Dakota.

Be that as

it may, we want at least to realize that the Democrats made a
concrete appeal to the farmer's vote.

There seems to be a

strong foundation for the observation of the Wall Street
Journal that "apparently there was just one 'vote' reached by
special appeal - the farmerst"58a

With this quick look

at Wilson Progressive legislation in general and its appeal
to the farmer in particular, let us now turn to labor's part
in the election.

58a ~ Street Journal, November 11, 1916.

CHAPTER VI
THE LABOR VOTE AND THE CANDIDATES
The labor vote was undoubtedly stirred by two bills
that were pushed through Congress by President Wilson, but
whether they had the effect of favoring the President is hard
to determine.

It seems that throughout the country the

labor vote was rather evenly divided, but when narrowed down
to the all-important state of California it could easily have
been the deciding factor.

At any rate, the Administration's

labor policies did provide a vital issue in the campaign, and
so are worthy of our consideration if only on that score.
The acts that were to draw labor's attention were tJ:le Child
Labor Act and the Adamson Act.
The Child Labor Bill had originally appeared in the
Progressive platform of 1912, and was only incorporated by
the Democrats and the Republicans in 1916.

While it was not

opposed by the Republicans it was pleasing to the Progressives and the circumstances surrounding the bill might have
helped the President to a slight degree.

The Democratic

majority in the Senate had decided in caucus to exclude this
bill from the list of measures to be enacted before adjournment, but on July 18 the President paid an unexpected visit to
91

r
92
the Capitol to urge trJe Senate leaders to reconsider this decision. l

The bill had already passed the House by an over-

whelming majority, the Republican leaders in the Senate desired favorable action, and only a small but determined
minority of Southern senators opposed it.

As a correspond-

ent of the Boston Transcript pointed out:
••• for the first time, certainly in this
administration, if not in many years,
there is the spectacle of the President
of the United States fighting the minority
of his own party with the aid of leaders
of the opposition. 2
Whether the dominant motive of President Wilson in his dramatic eleventh-hour demand for the passage of the child-labor
law was politics or humanity - the newspapers naturally took
both views - it was evident, at any rate, that the people
wanted the measure and backed the President in his move.

Only

three states, the two Carolinas and Georgia, seriously opposed the bill which put an end to interstate commerce in
goods made in mills which employed children under fourteen
years of age, or in which children under sixteen years of age
worked more than eight hours a day or were employed before
seven o'clock in the morning or after seven o'clock in the
evening.
1 Ibid., July 29, 1916.
2 Ibid.
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The appeal of the bill to the Progressives was noted
by the Yiashington correspondents, while its attractiveness to
the hearts of women was noted by Mrs. O. H. P. Belmont with
the exclamation:

"Is this a Machiavellian stroke?

Does our

President at last see the wisdom of catering to those four
million women voters out West?,,3

As one can guess, Mrs.

Belmont was a suffragette referring to her militant sistersuffragetters in the West.

The Springfield Republican re-

marked that the Republican candidate's slurs upon Democratic
progressiveness "would stand more chance of being believed" if
the Democratic party had not put this piece of legislation on
the statute books;4

and the Republican New York Tribune, a

consistent critic of tbe administration, remarked:
If President Wilson was seeking political
credit when he insisted on the passage of
this bill, he is entitled to it now ••• While
he was merely taking up near its end tbe
campaign carried on by reformers for years,
he gave aid when it was much needed, and he
took his stand regardless of offending
wealthy Southerners whose political support
he may need.5
The circumstances surrounding the Adamson Act gave a
great deal of publicity utilized by Wilson in the campaign.
3 Ibid., 53:6, August 5, 1916.
4 Ibid., 53:70, August 12, 1916.
5 Ibid., 53:10, September 2, 1916.
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Headlines and front-page columns were given to Wilson and his
work day after day so that his part in this labor drama kept
him in the public eye.

,The Adamson Law, which established th

basic eight-hour day, with time-and-a-half for overtime, came
a bout mainly as tile result of a long, hard-fought campaign on
the part offour powerful brotherhoods of railway employees engaged in carrying freight between the states.

The engineers,

the firemen, the conductors and the trainmen made up the strong
unions that had come to be known as the "big four tl •

It was

said that the agitation was not for a working day restricted
to eight hours, for the laborers would agree that such a regulation would hardly be feasible in the railroad buSiness, but
for an eight-hour standard of pay.

It was also said that the

plan was first brought forward by sectional organizations of
the brotherhoods as early as 1909, and, after gaining momentum
over a period of seven years, it reached the railroad chiefs
in March, 1916, backed by the united support of from 325,000 to
400,000 men. 6

The owners of the railroads candidly added

that the public would ultimately be made to bear the burden
when and if the brotherhoods realized their objective.
The American railroads had been controlled rather

6 F. A. Ogg, National Progress, Harper & Brothers, New York,
1918, 353.
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effectively during the previous twelve years by the Interstate
Commerce Commission which held them to the published tariffs,
barred them from pooling and rebating, and kept them subject
to administrative bodies whose tendency was to keep the rates
down.

·Workmen's compensation and safety measures increased

costs and operating expenses of the carriers, and while they
sold their wares in a controlJed market they bought their labor
in a competitive market.

Interest on their bonds and divi-

dends to their stockholders were low while funds for improvements were meagre. Such is the sympathetic picture painted by
Paxson. 7
On the other hand there was "the prosperity enjoyed by the railroads due to the heavy exports being made to
Europe and to all the world since shortly after the war began."8

Doubtless this was one of the reasons for the rest-

iveness of the workers.
In June, 1916, the railroad owners urged that the
matt6r be brought before a tribunal of arbitration, but the
labor heads would not cooperate.

Throughout the summer every

attempt at mediation. was blocked by the railroad brotherhoods,
,

and the prinCiple of an "eye form eye" was employed by labor,
which in former times had pleaded in vain for arbitration.

By

August when it was clear to all concerned that the brotherhood

7 Paxson, 354.
8 Ogg, 355.

had a death-grip on the nation's economy, the country became
extremely anxious and the representatives of tr.e allied governments of western Europe without a doubt shared this anxiety.

If the strike came there would be no relief ttrough in-

junctions of the Federal courts, as had been the case in the
past; labor strikes had been exempted from this interference
through the recent Clayton Anti-Trust Law.
On August 16th President Wilson sent the following
telegram to the Presidents of fourteen different railways:
Discussion of the matter involved in
the threatened railway strike has reached
a point which makes it highly desirable
that I should personally confer with you
at the earliest moment and with the Presidents of other railways affected who may
be immediately accessible.
Hope you can
make it convenient to come to Washington
at once.9
When the brotherhood chairman and the railroad presidents arrived at the White House, Wilson listened to the arguments on
both sides, and then suggested that the railroads meet the request of the men for ten hours' pay for the first eight hours,
and that the question of the rate for overtime be submitted to
arbitration.

As the railroad executives refused to yield on

the eight-hour day unless it should be decreed by a tribunal
of arbitration, on August 28th the representatives left Wash9 Baker and Dodd, V, 264.
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ington with orders for a strike to begin at 7 A.M. on September 4th, which

tlwould tie up every railroad from Maine to

California and cause an insufferable paralysis of industry and
trade."lO
Wilson's name was now in the headlines daily for he
seemed the only hope of preventing the strike.

On August

29th, he appeared before a joint session of Congress assembled
in the Hall of the House of Representatives, and addressed the
Legislature for approximately half an hour.

Begging assist-

ance in dealing with a very grave situation, he proceeded to
recommend the following legislation:

(1) the enlargement of

the administrati.ve organization of the Interstate Commission;
(2) the establishment of the eight-hour day for all railway
employees engaged in the work of operating trains in interstate transportation; (3) authorization of the appointment by
the President of a small body of men to observe the actual results in experience of the adoption of the eight-hour day;
(4) explicit approval by Congress of the consideration by the
Interstate Commission of an increase of freight rates, should
the facts justify the increase; (5) addition to the federal
statute, which provides for arbitration in such controversies
as the present, of a provision that in case the methods of
10 Ogg,

356.
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accommodation now provided should fail, a full public investi
gation of the merits of every dispute shall be instituted and
completed before a strike or lockout may be lawfully attempted; (6) and, finally, that the Executive should have the
power, in case of military necessity; to take control of such
portions of the railways as may be required and operate them
for military purposes, with authority to draft into the military service of the United States such train crews and administrative officials as the circumstances might require for
their sage and efficient use. Il
When Wilson had sent the telegrams already mentioned to the various railroad presidents on August 16th, he
had followed up with a statement for the public in which he
said that only experience could determine just what arrangements should be equitable for both the workers and the railroads.

But he pointed out that certain railroads which had

already adopted the eight-hour day did not appear to be at
any serious disadvantage "in respect to their cost of operation as compared with the railroads that have retained the
t en-hour day. 1112

In the same statement Wilson claimed that

the eight-hour day now "undoubtedly has the sanction of the
judgment of society in its favor, and should be adopted."

He

11 Congressio!.l,§.l Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 53,

13335-6.

12 Baker and Dodd, V, 265.
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had enlarged on this same idea in his message to Congress on
August 29th:
The whole spirit of the time and the
preponderant evidence of recent economic
evidence spoke for the eight-hour day.
It has been adjudged by thought and experience of recent years a thing upon which
society is justified in insisting on as
in the interest of health, efficiency,
contentment, and a general increase of
economic vigor.
The whole presumption
of modern experience would, it seemed to
me, be in its favor whether there was
arbitration or not. i 3
In that same address to

Congress Wilson claimed

that the railroad heads had rejected his plan because they wer
convinced that they must "at any cost to themselves or to the
country, stand firm for the principle of arbitration which the
men had rejected." 14

Wilson said that he also stood firmly

in favor of the principle of arbitration in industrial disputes, but that matters had come to a sudden crisis in this
particular dispute, and the country had been caught unprovided
with any practical means of enforcing the principal of arbitration in practice.

"I have based my counsel upon the in-

disputable fact that there was no means of obtaining arbitration." 15

Wilson's intention was obviously to secure peace

in the crisis by yielding to the demands of the railroad

13 Congressional Record, ip.cit., 13336.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
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brotherhoods, but also to put through such legislation as
would make any such crisis impossible in the future.
Congress acted according to Wilson's desires but not
completely, for although the Adamson Bill passed the House on
August 31st and the Senate on September 1st, these two bodies
cut away Wilson's proposals which looked to similar disputes i
the future and also decided that the Bill would become effective on January 1st and not earlier. 16
Taken by itself, the Adamson Act was controversial
in character but since it was election time it became naturally
enough, the subject of many debates.

A few hostile periodi-

cals and newspapers will reveal the Republican attacks.

"Con-

gress Stampeded" was the title of an article in Nation in
which the writer concluded with a plea to "patriotic 1\.mericans"
to decide for themselves whether or not the avoiding of the
strike was worth "such a sacrifice of the nation's dignity".l?
The same journal later chastised Wilson for rushing through
"the judgment of society" in 48 hours, and then for being so
bold as to defend the intrinsic merits of such lightning legislation.

In a constitutional government, the writer argued •••

16 Ibid., 13335-6, 133552.
17 Nation, September 7, 1916.
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••• there are certain recognized ways
of seeing that the 'judgment of society'
shall be embodied in laws. Boiled down
to its essentials, [Wilson's] defense
would justify passing in 48 hours anyth~ng
that he thought [good for the nation.]l
A letter to the editor of Nation pointed out the incongruity
of considering as the "judgment of society" a law whic.h. benefited only the "comparatively few members of the four strongly
organized unions."

It went on to say that the situation

would be fairly staggering were we candid enough to admit that
20 percent of the employees of a great public service industry
were dictating not only to the remaining 80 percent, but also
to the holders of $20,000,000 worth of stocks and bonds. 19
The New York Times ran a

scathi~g

editorial on Sep-

tember 2nd which included the following cry:
The blackmailing of the whole nation under
the threat of a strike and the extortion of
a special act granting the demands of the
brotherhood without time to inquire into the
justice and practicability •.• put upon the
country an intolerable humiliation. If such
an outrage can be put upon us unresisted, we
have lost our republican form of government.Below
This theme of "national humiliation" was stressed by papers
throughout the country especially ti1e Republican papers, a fact
indicated in polls conducted by both the Literary Digest and
Outlook. 20

18 Nation, September 28, 1916. (Words in [ J are mine).
19 New York Times, September 2, 1916.
20 Literary Digest, 53: , September 6, 1916; Outlook CXIV,
September 13, 1916.
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The most prominent opponent of the Adamson Law, however, was Charles Evans Hughes.

His attack upon the Law evoked

the cry from the San Francisco Bulletin that instead of the
many "manufactured campaign issues, we now have one that grew,
like Topsy, and is real flesh and blood.,,21

Although a

majority of the Republicans in Congress voted with the Democrats in favor of the Adamson Law, Hughes nevertheless saw it
as a tfblow at business in this country," and its enactment
spelled lithe surrender of the very principle of government."
It was, he claimed, Iflegislation without inquiry," and "the demand by the Administration for such legislation as the price of
peace was a humiliating spectacle.,,22
In particular, however, Hughes urged three arguments
against the Law.

In the first place it merely raised wages,

but did not reduce hours.

Moreover, it should not have been

passed without more time for investigation.

Finally, Wilson

knew for over a year that the crisis was coming, and should
have been prepared for it. 23

To these arguments presented at

a Republican rally in Springfield, Illinois, the Democrats were
quick to answer.

With regard to his charge that the bill was

a wage bill and not an hours bill, they replied that it of21 Literary Digest, 53:12, September 16, 1916.
22 Ibid., 53:15, October 7, 1916.
23 New Republic, September 30, 1916.
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fered the railroads the alternative of receiving 8 hours work
for ten hours pay, or of doing 10 hours work in 8 hours.

The

railroads might save the extra pay by increasing the speed of
certain freight trains.

Furthermore, the law offered a

tldirect economic incentive" to greater productivity, and though
the incentive would have been strengthened by keeping the timeand-a-half overtime which Wilson proposed, Congress would have
been accused of increasing wages by 37 1/2% instead of 25%.24
On Hughes' second point, namely, lack of time for
sufficient investigation, the Democrats retorted that for over
a year the "expertstt had been investigating, and that the whole
process was becoming a grand tlguessing contest."
Arbitration could only continue to guess.

A Board of

Hughes merely

meant "guesswork before legislationn when he called for invest
igation, while Woodrow Wilson and the Adamson Law stood for
an "inductive experiment" on the basis of six months trial. 2 5
With regard to Hughes' assertion that the President
should have legislated to forestall the crisis, the Democrats
admitted that while it would have looked better for Wilson,
had the Adamson Law been enacted two or three months before
showdown finally came, it was very doubtful in the minds of th
Democrats that Wilson could have forced such a law through
24 New Republic.
25 Ibid.
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Congress except under pressure, for the attitude of the American public would have been that of the man who said, "Who is
he (Wilson) to meddle in this business and borrow trouble. tt26
In his Labor Day speech Hughes had also directed
some remarks to the principle of arbitration saying:

"I be-

lieve and I stand here firmly for the principle of arbitrating
all industrial disputes, and I would not surrender it to anybody in the country. 11

He added:

••• I stand for two things: first, for the
principle of fair, thorough, candid arbitration; and second, for legislation of facts
according to the necessities of the case;
and I am opposed to qeing,dictated to
either in the executive department or in
Congress by any power on earth before the
facts ~7e ~nown and in the absence of
facts.
That Wilson did not sacrifice this principle of arbitration
was the opinion expressed in an article in Outlook; rather,
Wilson "butted inn to rescue successfully the public from
starvation.

Our legislators, claimed the writer, were too

sensible lito haggle with an earthquake. tl28

However, a better

response was given by New Republic and Wilson's biographers
when they blamed Congress for eliminating the recommendations
made by Wilson for maintaining the principle of arbitration

26 Ibid.
27 New Yorlc Times" September 7, 1916.
28 F. R. Serri, "Mr. Hughes and the Railroad Issue,tI;
Outlook, October 11, 1916.
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and for a better handling of future strikes. 29

Despite all

the argumentation that filled papers and periodicals there
was, it seemed to me, a great deal of truth in the remark of
the New York Independent that
••• attack and defense in this case did
not meet head on since 'Mr. Hughes does not
discuss the merits of the 8-hour day for
railroad operatives and Mr. Wilsm does
not discuss the propriety of enacting the
-law with unusual rapidity because the
workers threatened to strike if it did
not become law by a given day.130
At any rate all this publicity from the middle of August was
not only keeping Wilson before the public eye but it pictured
him as favorable to labor.
But whether or not the Adamson Act influenced the
vote, is more or less an open question even if the Progressives were certainly attracted by this piece of legislation.
In the all-important state of California, and especially in
the city of San Francisco, organized labor was made even more
conscious of the difference between the Progressive Wilson
and the Conservative Hughes.

The difference between the two

men was accentuated by Wilson's action in the railroad and
an incident that occurred at the time of Hughes' visit to San
Francisco.

On August 19th on the front page of the San

29 New Republic, September 9, 1916; also Dodd, 164 and H. F.
Bell, Woodrow Valson and the People, Doubleday Doran & Co.,
New York, 1945, 380.
30 Literary Digest, 53:15, October 7, 1916.

106
Francisco Call these joint headlines were flaunted before the
laborer's eyes: "Waiters Strike at Hughes Luncheon" and "Wilson Bids Railroad Chiefs Grant 8 Hours;1I

and in the columns

they read that the "Union lVien Refuse to Serve at Club - Cafes
Send Open Shop Men to Wait on Hughest"31

While on the front

page of the Bulletin they read: "Union Men Ask Hughes Not to
Dine in Open Shop Club ,'82 the Chronicle, a Republican paper,
judiciously relegated the news of the waiters' strike to a
small column on the second pag8. 33
What was the incident that brought on these headlines?

When the culinary workers in the city went on strike

for the closed shop on August 1st they faced bitter opposition
from organized employers.

Hughes was to dine at a political

party luncheon at the Commercial Club which, like most of the
other prominent hotels, fought the unions and maintained an
open shop.

Hence, for Hughes' luncheon the Club was forced to

hire scab-laborers and it was these men who served Hughes.
"Whatever affront could be offered to organized labor by such
an episode was offered"34
tor.

is the observation of one commenta-

Wisely or not, Hughes made no mention of the strike at

the luncheon, but the antithesis between his position and that
of Wilson was definitely highlighted by the two incidents.
31
32
33
34

San Francis~o Call, August 19, 1916.
San Francisco Bulletin, August 17, 1916.
San Francisco Chronicle, August 19, 20, 1916.
Paxson, 378.
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That labor realized this difference was made evident
by a presidential "straw vote" of Union Labor conducted by the
Literary Digest during October which sounded out "the consensus of political opinion of union-labor officials representing more than 100 trades."

The magazine claimed that

"out of 457 labor officials, 332 said their members favor Mr.
Wilson, 47 -,Mr. Benson, the Socialist Candidate, and 43 - Mr.
Hughes •"35

0 f course such a labor poll did no t have the mean-

ing that it would have today, for in Wilson's time there did
not exist the powerful unions of today which can so readily
swing their solid vote behind one candidate.

For example,

in 1948 the labor unions in their desire to repeal the TaftHartley Law and punish its Republican supporters backed Truman for the Presidency and Democratic Congressmen with a campaign expenditure of

~7,OOO,000.

The labor unions in 1948

were definitely united and could claim a major part in the
victory of the Democratic President, but in 1916 there was
not this union solidity.

Nevertheless, the labor vote played

an important part on the West Coast and in a few other
isolated states as was conceded by many newspapers and competent authorities.
Some Republican politicians admitted

th~t

the labor

vote was undoubtedly the means of carrying Ohio for V.ilson, an

35 Literary Digest, 53:15, October 7, 1916.
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it might have been the determining factor in California.
~illiam

G. Lee, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad

Trainmen, is quoted in the LiT,erary Digest as saying that

13,000 members of the railroad brotherhoods in California,
2,500 in New York, 12,000 in Minnesota, 3,500 in New fuexico
and 30,000 in Ohio were practically unanimous for vVilson.3 5,.."1.
(It is well to note that most of these states had been remarkably close in the election totals.)

The Tribune also

believed that these votes would not have been turned against
Hughes if he simply had kept quiet about the Adamson Law.
When he attacked it, the Brotherhoods made it their chief issue and campaigned directly under the Democratic National Committee, emphasizing the fact that the President had cast his
lot with them. 36
Offsetting this attraction of organized labor to
Wilson, was the antagonism of bankers, railroad magnates, and
business owners who, in their financial, railway and conservative papers, denounced the President as a foe to arbitration
in labor disputes.

Because of his progressive legislation,

the real opposition, as Dodd says,

...

came from the industrial centers, from
the former bankers, railroad magnates, and
the sturdy old Republican stocks of the East,
and the middle ii~est, men who were afraid of
35aIbid., 53:15, October 7, 1916.
Yor~ Tribune, November 14, 1916.

36 New
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even the moderate reforms of Southerners and agrarians, from people who thought
that the Government must ever reJlain subservient to the industrial regions which
had so long controlled the vital concerns
of the nation. They feared Wilson. Nor
did the larger labor organizations despite
all that Wilson had done for labor, support
the Democratic administration. Labor was
more afraid of "empty dinner pails" which
masters of industry threatened, than it was
hopeful of good things to come from friends
actually in power ••• 37
All that Doddclaims is apparently true, but in the vital western area, especially California,it could have been labor's
vote that decided the contest in Wilson's favor.
With this in mind it is interesting to note the
opinions of a few representative newspapers on this matter of
the influence of the labor vote upon the election's outcome,
particularly in those influential states of the west and midwest.

The Literary Digest published a symposium of the

following significant papers on November 18th:

the Cheyenne

Tribune of Wyoming thought that the chief factor in Wilsen's
victory was the large proportion of the railroad employees
voting for him; the Ivdnneapolis Journal named among the deciding factors the vote of the large labor centers and iron
range employees who swung to Wilson for his 8-hour stand;
the St. }'aul Pioneer Press thought that "the most reasonable
explanation was the organized labor vOGe in the three large

37 Dodd, 193.
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cities of Minnesota, together with the general pacifist character of the Swede population.

In Ohio the Cleveland Plain

Dealer attributed the second most influence to the industrial
and prosperous elements who cried, ttLet well enough alone;tt
in New Hampshire, the lone Wilson state in New England, the
8-hour law was considered a major factor as it was also by the
Republican Kansas Times of Leavenworth. 38
We would expect the San Francisco papers to contain
the most pertinent comments on the labor vote and yet they were
preoccupied with the ;'rogress i ve-Conservative clash among the
Republicans and carried little about the Labor vote.

HO'it'lever,

the Mercury-Herald of nearby San Jose thought that the "victory of Wilson in San Francisco was clearly due to the cohesive
labor vote" which felt grateful to the President for jamming
through Congress the Adamson 8-hour law. 39

Moreover, the San

Francisco Chronicle ran an article written by Chester Rowell,
Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee in which he
asserted that the labor vote, added to the minority of
Progressives and the pacifist's woman's vote, turned the tide
for Wilson. 40

Across the country in New York the Tribune

pointed but that in San Francisco, lithe heart of California and
38 Literary Di~est, 53:21, November 18, 1916; also Outlook,
November 28, 1916.
39 San Jose Mercury-Herald, November 19, 191~.
40 San Francisco Chronicle, November 11, 1916.
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perhaps the strongest labor union city in the country,"
Wilson won nine out of the 13 assembly districts.

~ignifi-

cantly, the paper pointed to the flluncheon mistake" of
Hughes, "his failure to recognize Hiram Johnson", and the
"criticism of his opponent. u4l
In Los Angeles, where Hughes tied in with Harrison
OtiS, the arch-enemy of union labor in the state, the Express
gave first and second place respectively to the progressive
polictes of the Democrats and the labor vote. 42
Naturally,
other newspapers thought other factors more important.

It is

our purpose, however, to show which were the chief sources of
the deciding votes.

So much, then, for the labor legisla-

tion and its part in influencing the American people and in
building up the appeal to the Progressives.

41 New York Tribune, November 13, 1916.
42 Los Angeles Express, November 10, 1916.

CHAPTER VII
TEE RESPONSE OF THE PROGRESSIVES
But how were the Progressives taking to the two
candidates through the campaigning?
talked up both men.

The newspapers naturall

Speaking at Plattsburg on September

12th, the day after the supposedly significant Republican
clean sweep of the primaries in Maine, Hughes expressed his
feelings (or hopes?), "I come to you as the spokesman of a
reunited party."l

But reunion in fact was far less than

in hope for it was becoming evident that not even Roosevelt,
the former idol of the Progressives, could deliver the whole
Progressive vote to the Republicans.
The Progressive votes were definitely split if one
could judge from the positions taken by the prominent men in
the party.

Francis Heney, fiery prosecutor and violent

'bull-mooser', ran as a Democratic elector in California and
led his ticket.

While Albert Beveridge, as we have seen al-

ready, stumped for Hughes, Victory Murdock, editor of the
Whicita Daily Eagle, and chairman of the defunct Progressive
National Committee supported Wilson.

His close associates,

Gifford Pinchot and James R. Garfield, followed Roosevelt
1 Paxson, 359-360.
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into the Republican line, but each had a distinguished
brother who came out for Wilson.

The scientists, John

Burroughs and Luther Burbank, lent their name to the Democrats, as did Thomas A. Edison and Henry Ford. 2
"John M.
Parker, the Progressive Vice-Presidential candidate, bitterly attacked Roosevelt for returning to a Republican party
more reactionary than ever before."3

Bainbridge Colby

also came out for Wilson as did Samuel Gompers who joined
wi th the Vice "resident and Secretary of the American Federation of Labor in a statement which strongly recommended the
Democrats. 4
Evidently the "feast of unity" held by Hughes
and Roosevelt in New York on October 3 5 was not as successful as they had hoped it to be and Wilson's praise of the
Progressives in a speech of September 30th seemed to have
fallen upon sympathetic ears among the Drogressives.
To remove any doubt as to the attractiveness of
Wilson's record of legislation to the Progressives, the New
York Times tells us that just a few days before the election,
eleven of the nineteen members of the defunct platform committee of the Progressive party convention of 1912 endorsed
2 Ibid., 360.
3 Baker, 287.
4 New York Times, October 22, 1916.
5 Ibid., October 4, 1916.
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Wilson and called upon all members of the party to support
him.

They declared:
Of thirty-three planks in the Progressive platform of 1912, twenty-two have
been wholly or partly enacted into laws.
Of eighty propositions embodied in these
planks, more than half have been cagried
out by administrative acts or laws.
However, the really important defection of the

Progressives was in the West and especially in the state of
California.

Colonel House, realizing the effects of Hughes'

campaigning in the West remarked sarcastically:

"I ex-

pressed regret that the Democratic Committee's finances were
in such condition that they could not offer to pay for •••
for instance, the Golden Special."

This was the name of

the train that the Republicans sent West with Hughes aboard
and House thought his trip worthy of Democratic pay.7

But

Tumulty had made similar observations even before the actual
trip to the VJ est.

In a letter to Mr. Raymond T. Baker on

August 4th he had remarked:
My belief is that Hughes' trip to the
West will prove another distinct disappointment to his friends. A candidate
following the path of expediency as exemplified by Hughes will find himself in an
unenviable position in the West, merely

6 Ibid. November 1, 1916.
7 Seymour, 371.
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criticizing, finding fault, and setting
forth no policy of a constructive
character.(j
This prediction was remarkably accurate, and in it Tumulty
stressed an essential weak point in Hughes' campaign, namely that he had to attack achievements and not principles of
doubtful value.
Two things stand out in Hughes' western campaign,
the critical tenor of his speeches and his failure to acknowledge Johnson and the Progressives.

The critical rather

than constructive character of his speeches, noted by the
newspapers and prominent men centered mostly upon the administration's disregard of the merit system, failure to
maintain the constitutional rights of American citizens in
Mexico, and general inefficiency.9

A quotation by the Call

Bulletin of San Francisco was very expressive of the Progressive sentiment toward Hughes' speeches:

"We have waited

in vain for Mr. Hughes to say something that would show his
reputed Progressivism. ,,10
The second' factor, one which gained a great deal of
unwanted publicity for the Republicans and for Hughes, was th
so-called tlsnubbing" of Governor Johnson.

It was picked up

8 Tumulty, 1959 San Francisco Call-Bulletin, August 15-25, 1916.
10 Literary Digest, 53:10, September 9, 1916.

,
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immediately by the newspapers and most books on this period
regard the episode as one of the major reasons for the Democratic majority in California.
follows.

Briefly the story was as

In 1908 California had gone Republican 2 to 1 and

in 1912 the state had given its electoral votes to the Progressives.

Roosevelt was the Progressive candidate for the

Presidency that year and his running mate for the vicepresidency was Hiram Johnson, the Governor 01" California.
Johnson nevertheless had remained in control of the Republican party's State Committee despite the fact that he had
turned Progressive.

In 1914, though the ,Conservative Re-

publicans regained control of the State Central Committee
Johnson was then

elected Governor on the Progressive ticket.

Rence when delegates were selected for the Chicago convention
of the Republicans, tIle Conservatives, angry at Johnson for
his Progressive affiliation, refused to join the two parties'
delegates and sent conservative Republicans to represent the
party.
When Hughes arrived in California Johnson was out
dutifully canvassing for Hughes, and himself as Progressive
and Republican candidate for the United States Senate, a
situation possible under California laws.

The Conservative

Republicans had no desire to see Johnson elected and so they
ignored him.

At the largest of the party rallies in San
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Francisco on August 18th, despite the fact that the Progressives demanded that Johnson be acclaimed, Johnson was not
even in attendance, the Conservative RepUblicans simply refusing to recognize him.

Throughout the campaign, though

there was one occasion when they were in the same hotel,
Hughes never spoke to Johnson.

Paxson notes

••• that it helped JOAoson in his personal campaign that the stalward Republican
committee were so openly his enemies but
it did not help Hughes that the most influential political personage in the State
should be affronted.~l
Johnson never referred to the incident, nor did he waver in
his loyalty to Hughes, but his followers did, and "the country knew that the Central Committee had endangered the election of Hughes because of its animosity to Johnson. tl12
look predicted that Hughes'

Out-

tfunbenevolent neutrality" would

make the voting close in California. 13

Naturally, the

Democratic papers played up this chance to widen the breach
between the Republicans and the Progressives.

Even the in-

dependent Call-Bulletin printed on the front page:

If

Hughes

Blunders Here Lost Him 100,000 Votes Say the Progressives,"
and added "Hughes seen in company of men whose very names
11 Paxson, 356, 357.
12 Ibid., 356, 357.
13 Outlook, October 25, 1916.
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have always spelled reaction and anti-progressivism throughout the state."14

Two days before in an editorial jt had

spoken of Johnson's absence from the flregular" function at
which Mr. Hughes was entertained in San Francisco.

The

Democratic San Francisco Post had likewise stressed nughes'
departure from the state without having once met Governor
Johnson. 15

The silence of the Republican Chronicle is

again significant.
The voting in California seemed to confirm the
predictions of Progressives and the Democratic newspapers
that California would be lost to the Republicans.

Of the

531 electoral votes, 266 were necessary for a victory.
out California, Hughes had 254 and Wilson had 264.

With-

The

thirteen votes of California loomed high in importance dtITing
those last few hours of vote counting.

To accentuate the

sDspense, Governor Johnson had already been elected by a huge
majority of 296,815 votes, indicating what might have been
accomplished for Hughes if he and bis managers had bestowed a
gracious smile upon the right people.

As it turned out,

Wilson took CaliforLia's electoral votes by the slight margin
14 San Francisco Bulletin, August 23,1916.
15 San Francisco Call, August 21, 1916.
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of 3773 popular votes.

Mark Sullivan remarked, "however

much it (the outcome) was due to the action of Johnson's
followers whom Johnson could not control, the incident,
normally a local teapot tempest, achieves high importance
when we realize how different history would have been. Hl6
Naturally the Progressives claimed credit for the
election results, but the newspapers, even the Republican
ones, likewise attriouted great importance to the Progressive
vote.

The San Francisco Hulletin claimed that the "defec-

tion from Mr. Hughes began when he came to the State and
affiliated with the anti-Johnson Republicans" and that many
Johnson Progressives turned to Wilson because of his prog.ressi vism. ,,17

The San Francisco Examiner summed up its

opinion in the editorial title tlProgressive vote defeats
Hughes H18

and the Call & Post in an article with the cap-

tion, ttHughes lost by party politics. n1 9

The Los Angeles

Express among many causes included the progressive policies
of Wilson and the fact that "Hughes had been used by a small
group of' California reactionaries. H20

-16
17
18
19
20

,-

The Los Angeles

Sullivan, Our Times, V, 243.
San Francisco Bulletin, ~ovember 10, 1916.
San Francisc9 Examiner, November 11, 1916.
San Francisco Call ~ ~, November 11, 1916.
~ Angeles Express, November 11, 1916.
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Times, a Republican paper hostile to Johnson, bitterly cried
that ttthere was undoubtedly a treasonable combine in northern
California between Johnson and Wilson supporters. tl

It even

blazed headlines lii<e the following: "Johnson is blamed for
treachery,"

"How Johnson's perfidy beat Hughes," and ttHughes

secretly traded off for Johnson • .,21

These were exaggera-

tions because Johnson, regardless of his followers, still
canvassed for Hughes despite the affront given him.

He an-

swered the attack of the Los Angeles Times in an article that
was run on the front page of the San Francisco Call and Post
in which he blamed the Conservative Republicans for the loss
since they had issued an "ultimatum" that Itr. Hughes would
have nothing to do with the Progressives in California.,,22
The Spokane Spokesman-Review conceded prime importance to the
I

fact "that Washington is Progressive, and the refusal of the
Republicans to recognize Progressives resulted in resentment
that swept many into the Democratic ranks.,,23
In the East, too, on November 12th the New York
Times claimed that the nVote of Women and Bull Moose Elected

,

Wilson. 1124

while the Independent (harper's Weekly) in its

analysis included these two elements among four:
• • • the conviction on the part of the
western progressives, who are more radical
12! Angeles Times, November 10, 11, 1916.
2!ll Francisco Call and ~, November 11, 1916.
Spokane Spokesman-Review, November 11, 1916.
~ York Times, November 12, 1916.

~~-~-~-

21
2?

2)

24
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and warmhearted than their eastern
brothers, that liiir. Wilson was more their
kind of a Progressive than Mr. Hughes
and their belief that the Democratic party
under the leadership of Mr. Wilson is the
present party of progress, while the Republican party under the present leadership is the party of the backward look;
••• the willingness of the Republican candidate to content himself with an attack upon
Mr. Wilson and his deeds, and the failure
of the Republican campaign to develop any
kind o~ positive appeal to the progressive
vote. 2 ..J
The New York American, usually critical of Wilson's policies,
admitted that the Progressives were probably satisfied with
Wilson's progressive legislation;26

while the Boston Globe

considered Uthe verdict a victory for Democratic and:1> rogressive ideas."27

The Fhiladelphia Ledger thought that

the Progressive vote in a sense is the whole reason why Republicans failed "because it explains the enormous defection
of Republicans in California. tt28
While the Chicago Herald
chimed in that Hughes was beaten because the people of California and other states of the West believed him, unjustly,
to be a puppet of the Old Guard.,,29
Progressives also confirmed the opinions of the
press.
25
26
27
28
29

John M. Parker, former i'rogressi ve candidate for the

Independent, 88:3546, November 20, 1916.
York American, November II, 1916.
Boston Globe, November 10, 1910.
Philadelphia Ledger, November 20~ 1916.
Chicago Herald, November 13, 1910.

~
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Vice-Presidency, thought that the human-welfare and progressive legislation of Wilson, more than had been enacted
in the preceding fifty years, was undoubtedly of the greatest appeal to the Progressives. 30
Bainbridge Colby was of
the opinion that the Progressives cost Hughes the vote in
California, and, he estimated that from 60 to 70 percent of
the Progressives voted for Wilson,3l

while Matthew Hale, a

Massachusetts Progressive considered Wilson to be the foremost Progressive in the country.32

Chester H. Rowell,

former Progressive and chairman of the Republican State
Central Committee of California opined that
••• Charles Hughes was defeated because
his western trip did not convince the
rank and file of Western Progressives
that his election would mean a sufficient
recognition of the Progressive movement
and influence in a newer Republicanism. 33
The Democratic National

Comm~eemen

from California also

admitted that without the help of the Progressives and independents they could not have carried California. 34
Among historians there are two who comment
directly upon this point.
30
31
32
33
34

James Truslow Adams thought it

San Francisco Bulletin, November 11, 1916.
Ibid.
~ ~ American, November 11, 1916.
SaD Francisco Bulletin, November 10, 1916.
Literary Digest, 15:22, November 10, 1916.
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probable that "the apparent lack of interest shown by Hughes
in progressive policies at home, as well as his somewhat
evasive speeches on all topics, had gained as many votes as
the slogan ••• "35

Dwight Dumond is of the opinion tnat "the

presidential election did not hinge on the war issue l1 but
rather claimed that "the Republican candidate ••• was defeated
because neither he nor his party would endorse or offer a substitute for the social and economic reform program. tt36
In his autobiography William Allen White wrote:
tI • • •

the returns ••• proved clearly that Wilson was elected by

the votes of the Progressive states normally Republican in the
Middle West, many of them for Roosevelt in 1912 ••• "

To prove

that "Hughes was not sufficiently aware of the Progressive
issues to appeal to these Republican states,tt he recalled a
conversation with Hughes during the heat of the campaign when
Hughes asked him: ttWhat are the Progressive issues?"

Hughes

then listened to White's summary of them with sympathetic
intelligence, but White was of the opinion that Hughes did
not comprehend how earnestly a considerable section of public
opinion had accepted and endorsed these issues.

White then

added that the people of Kansas and the other western states

35 Adams, History of the U.S., 209.
36 Dwight Dumond, Roosevelt to Roosevelt, Henry Holt & Co.,
New York, 1937, 213.
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who voted a Republican state ticket and then voted for Wilson
did so "because of his progressive achievements in his first
term. ,,37
It seems that whether the Progressive issue eclipsed
the war issue or not, we can at least draw from the above summary of Wilsonts legislation and its appeal to the Progressives the conclusion that the Progressive vote did have an important effect upon the results of the election that saw Wilson carry the West, put Ohio in the Democratic column, and
take the close races in New Mexico, Minnesota and New Hampshire.
Just as the platitudes of Thomas E. Dewey failed to
carry the American voters with him in 1948, so too, in 1916
the pIa ti tudinous speeches of Nr-. Hughes brought him short of
victory.

As the New York Times editorial said:
Wilson appealed to the country upon his
record of public achievement ••• No issue
was settled, because no issue was raised
by Mr. Hughes. From his own utterances
the country reached the conclusion, it
could reach no other, that in Mr. Wilsonts
place, he would have adopted Mr. Wilsonts
policies, that if elected he would continue
Mr. Wilson's policies.
The electorate chose
Mr. Wilson because it knew him better,
understood him better, because it was averse
to a change.38

37 White, Autobiography, 350-352.
38 New York Times, November 10, 1916.
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It was thus that Hughes, making no appeal to the Progressives,
found himself weaker in November than he had been in June.
People forgot that his governorship had been a constructive,
progressive administration.

co~rCLLTSIOE

Thus it was that the election of 1916, so important
because of the critical state of tl}e world 2n('1 .Anerica' s
growinr prominence in world affairs, seemed to

hi~-e

upon the

two imnortant issues of Wilson's neutrality and proEressivism,
made real to the people? of the nation by a simTJle slo"'an and a
series of legislc,tion.

The :;"ormer

\:Jon

the

~JOmen

and the

pacifists, the latter, a section of the Proprcssives sufficient to TJrovide a
.At first

sli~ht

1;Te

However, althourh the

najority •

ToJOnder 1,'lhy the election ';Jas so close.
was ten to seven in favor of

bettin~

Hughes, the Republican candidate h2d an extremely difficult
task, some 1..rhat comperable to role of President Truman in

19)+9 uhen he battled to
combination of the

P2,SS

Re~ublicans

his ovm De;n.ocratic party.
had to steer his

legislation afainst the 'om·rerful

campai~n

an~

the southern minority of

From convention to election Hughes
ship throu-h a political Scylla and

Charybdis ';Ji th Hoosevel t cmd his bitterly c.nti-German followers on one sioe, and on tho. other, the influential GermanAmerican politicians,

ne~JSnaDer~en
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and voters.

Beyond this
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danger lay another obstacle in the radical element of the
former

Pro~ressives,

whose loyalty had to be held without

alienatinr the Conservative

~ajority

of the Republican ranks.

It is not stran[e, then, that just as Dewey stressed
Il

na tior:al unityll Ht'..01es

in a campaign that was a

eJ~1:OQ2sized

tlnational efficiency!!

masterni~ce

of

st~addling

but un-

fortunately and conse(luently filled ui th ':Teal,: appeals upon
the vital issues before the pu>lic.
To balance thcse

disadvanta~es

factors decidedly in Hughes f favor.

there were other

AltQouch Hughes "l'las a

conservative as the outmoded Dublic beord that adorned his
f2ce, stil"! this

conse::::,va·!~isr:.1 ',JaS

an asset r8.tLler than a

handicop if one considered the e13ction trend before 1916.
The cup of progress

WBS

filling up toward the end of the

Wilsonian administrction and a reaction toward conservatism
loomed up in the crystal ball,
results of the Naine Glections.

s8emin~ly

indicated by the

In 1900 the Conservative

IvJ:cKinley hRo dS.'cated a ProrTessive Bryan.

Then the see-8m.".

tilted 2.:nd the Pror:re ssi ve Roo.s evel t ros e in victory v!hile
the Conservative Parker i.vent dovm to defeat.
~ith

returned.

Conservatism

TEft in 1908 only to yield to the Progressive

Wilson in 1912.

~his

see-saw reaction indicated a trend that

.
· ' mean ano tl1e:..'" t
·
, lor
~
Conserva Glsm.
" l.l
IVOU 1 C,
con tlnUeG,
-rJ.umpn
.C>

-I- •
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This seems to be one of the basic reasons for the remarkably
close vote.
There was likel"!ise the other side of the 'Vlar issue
that t'las constantly brouGht home to the !)opu18T mtnd by the
Hearst papers throughout the country, namely the inefficiency
of l/lilson in foreign affairs, particularly in H:exico where his
misguided policy had prolonged the revolution and gained
nothing for the United. states but enmity and distrust.

Un-

doubtedly, these newspaper attacks added numbers to the ranks
of the conservative businessmen

'\1]110,

despite the Democratic

slogan of "He Kept Us Out Of Vlar fl VIi th its passionate support
by vast sections of the country, believed that "Wilson's
policy I,vas bI'inging the country rapidly nearer the brink and
that a prudent states;nan like Hughes had the best chance to
extricate the country from its si tuat:i_on. ,,1
These t1:!O factors vlere undoubtedly of great inflnence in the conservative east and are perhaps the best
ex~)lanation

\'Jhy, 1'111en this section s'imng so heavily to Hughes,

the ne'VTspapers of New York "'Ti th but tvlO exceptions took for
granted that the trend to conservatism
1

viaS

nation-':lide and

J.C.Long,Liberal PreSidents, Thomas Y. Rom1trell Company, Hew
York, 19lt8, 133.

129
the faith in Hughes' diplomacy greater than that in 1.lJilson.
Thus the ITew York l'Jorld, the Sun and the Herald either
aru~ounced

Hughes' victory on election night or predicted it

as certain.

While the Times prude:ltly 13ithheld jUflgment, the

New York American in spite of the mounting opinton of the
2
opposi tion predicted a 1,V1lson victory.
Only the American
foresai'J a Democratic storming of the lvest vlher!:.':) they took
not only the Democratic states but even such dependable
Republican centers as Utah and Kansas.
the l.fississippi l'lent to

~\lilson

Every state west of

except for Hinnesota, Iowa,

South Dakota, E.nd Oregon and these Ivere lost only by slight
margins.

',vorthy of note is the fact that although close to

a million votes had been cast for the Socialist candidates
in 1912, the number significantly dropped to about five
hundred thousand and it is hard to imagine thsse liberal
votes going for the representative of the Conservative
Republicans.
Wilson's victory, which made him the first President
to be elected without the votes either of New York or
Pennsylvania vrhose electoral votes were about one-third of
the total two hundred and sixty-six, Iva s based on a new
2 Nev; York American, November 9, 1916; this issue contained
a cOI"Jparative study of all the headlines of the 11e1'1 York
papers.
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alignment of the l'lest and the South.

It 'vas the importance

of the votes in the Hest, therefore, that

~llarks

this election

as exceptional since a solid Democratic south '..ras hardly a
novelty in A.merican
issues

vlit~l

~olitics.

Consequently, studyin,c: the

this in mind, has shot. m ho\'1, if politics is a

play upon public opinion, the Democrats were a bit more successful in gaugin", the public opinion of the T,'Iest than i.1ere
the Republicans.

The vIaI' issue with its slogan of "He Kept

Us Out Of War" vIas more in accord '.vi th the pacifist sentiments of a 'I.t'!estern area that

vlaS

marine I'Tarfare of tae east coast.

far removed from the subThe prosperity in agri-

cultural circles and ti.1e ac1mo',dedged attempts of '.:lilson and
the Democrats, esp':;cially during the cai;1paign, to improve the
lot of the farmers seemed to impress these politically sensitive citizens.

",lilson's sympathetic attitude to\,vard the

laboring man displayed in his stand for the Adanson Lct was
helpful, if only on the west coast and in the city of San
Francisco, especially when contrasted "';lith the opinions of
Hughes and the Repu>licans and the poor tactics curing the
campaign tour in that section of the country.

Finally, in the

all-important state of California, "'There the deciding votes
Ivere cast, the split beb-Jeen the Progressives and the
Republicans and the subsequent inability of Hughes and the

131
Republican committee to siding the Progressive votes back into
the Republican column, permi -:ted i:lilson' s progressivism to
be regarded as a satisfying alternative for those Progressives
who had bolted from the Republican party.
Our study of the issues has hardly been definitive
upon the subject for as someone remarked, " we hold an election
and then spend a lifetime

decidin~'

the v'Tinning issues."

The

deciding influence is too frequently Ul1.fathoma1:1e and even

vii th the comments of newspapers and magazines the result is
only an approximation '\:Jithou' certitude.

HOI,rever, these same

sources have helped us to understand just what ivere the
issues, and they have indicated, even thouph in an imperfect
fashion, the proportionate importance to ';e attached to the
numerous issues.

A study of the candidates' speeches before

the election and a review of the neivspapers after".·mrds indicated ho1,'! issues such as the I-loman's vote and the hyphenate
vote, though highly rated durin;:: the

cal:~paign,

to deserve the characterizatj_on of artificial.
papers 1'lere stressed

bec2,~~se

actually came
The ivestern

of the obviously 1mportant part

played by the 'Itlestern states, especially California.

vie

sincerely hope that our understanding of the deciding issues
has been enlarged and that some light has been added by this
survey of the issues in this all-important election of 1916.
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If there is one lesson that this election teaches, it is
the importance of the individual vote, for the closeness of
the final count in many states indicates the duty and
responsibility of each voter in the country.
President

vlaS

The

~an

elected

to shape A.merica' s destiny for a good many

years.
The victory '/las undoubtedly satisfying to the excollege p:i:"'ofessor if only because of the personal motive that
must have been aroused by the rather bitter criticism that
attended his second marriage to Mrs. Edith Bolling Galt
'vi thin fourteen months after the death of his first \vife.

The

confidence of the women voters seemed to prove how baseless
and malicious "Tere the calumnies by -,'Thich this President
had been attacked.

Then, too, Hilson \-{as to be given a chance

to test his idealistic principles and his

~_elief

in the

moral leadership of America and a lIpeace vJi thout victory."
Europe rejected both of these principles but he was to be more
:i tterly disappointed I'Then his ovm country I'lould rej ect his
plan for an international organization, the necessity for
"Thich he envisioned before the \-JOrld of his time
accept it.

'IIJaS

ready to

H01.'Jever, not only America but the 'It{hole ".vorld

\-JaS

to ack.nmvledge the need for today's version of the League of
Nations.
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